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No single revenue instrumilent  can be assumed to be superior for
mineral-dependent developing countries.  And more than one
instrument may be needed to meet a government's  multiple
objectives.  <.
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Many  developing  countries  depend  heavily  on  instruments  affcct risk-sharinig between  the
mineral  extraction  to generate  fiscal revenue  and  govemment  and  thc producer.  Applying  critcria
cam  foreign exchange.  Are thcse countries  for ranking  revenue instruments  to three  typical
collecting  enough  in return for depleting  their  instruments  -royalties,  income  taxes,  and
reserves?  Are they carrying  too much  of the  resource  rent taxes  - they  conclude  that al-
risk?  Conrad,  Shalizi,  and  Symc describe  work  though profit- and  rent-based  taxes are gaining  in
in progress  to develop  a practical  framework  for  popularity  over production-based  taxes,  no single
analyzing  these questions.  instrumcnt  can be presumed  to be superior  for
mineral-dependent  developing  countries.  Each
In the first part of the paper  !hey review  the  country has different  endowments  and  faces
central  issues  that must  be addressed  in design-  different  risks.  These  factors  must  be taken into
ing mineral  tax and payment  schemes.  They  account  when selecting  instruments  and deter-
note the  need to detcrmine  both the opportunity  mining  rates.  In somc  cases production-based
cost of mineral  cxtraction  (including  externalities  payments,  suchi as royalties,  may  be justified  and
vis-a-vis  other sectors  of the economy)  and the  should not be systematically  deemphasized  as
costs  borne by the  country through  risk-sharing  they  arc now.
arrangements.
Using simtlple  models  of thc type described  in
Obscrving  that at present  there  is no practical  the paper  will enable  governments  to cngage  in
analytical  framework  to analyze tradeoffs  or  reasonably  sophisticated  risk analysis  at a
determine  the rate structure  for differcnt  revenue  relatively  low cost when designing  tax  and
generating  instruments,  they introduce  a simple  payment  arrangemetis.  Further  work is required
cash-flow  model  in the  second  part of the paper.  to develop  a practical  framework  which  models
With  this model  they illustrate  how different  additional  tradeoffs.
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Many developing  countries  are still  heavily  dependent  on mineral
extraction  to generate  fiscal  revenue  and  to earn foreign  exchange. When
minerals  form a significant  proportion  of the country's  asset  base it  is
particularly  important  to have a  framework  to evaluate  the adequacy  of
compensation  schemes. Are these  countries  collecting  enough  in return  for
depleting  their  reserves?  Are these  countries  carrying  too much of the
risk?  This paper  describes work  in progress in developing such a
framework.
In many mineral dependent countries,  the government  holds the
mineral rights and enters into compensation  agreem,nts  with public or
private  firms  that will  extract the  resources.  In practice, the
distinction  between  factor  payments  and taxes  is increasingly  confused,  in
part because  governments  have a dual role as both mineral owner  and tax
collector.  This distinction  is more than a semantic  one since factor
payment policies are judged according to a dIfferent set of economic
criteria than are tax policies.  From this perspective,  the current
emphasis  on modifying  mineral tax/payment  arrangements  to maximize  rent-
capture,  without adequate  evaluation  of the opportunity  costs associated
with the  arrangements,  may  be  misplaced.
Given the high degree of risk and uncertainty  associated  with
mineral development, determining tax/payment arrangements  is further
complicated by the need to develop risk-sharing  schemes between the
government  (as  owner)  and  the  resource  extractors,  and  the  need to identify
externalities  affecting  other sectors  in the economy  that might justify
additional  modification  of the  tax/p-yment  arrangements.  The first  part  of- ii  -
the  paper reviews  these issues  briefly  and concludes  that  when objectives
are  not perfectly  correlated  it is preferable  to use  multiple  instruments
and  to  match  each  instrument  to an objective.
Despite  substantial  advances  in the  theoretical  literature,  there
is at present no practical analytical  framework  with which to analyze
tradeoffs  or to determine  the  rate  structure  for  the  different  instruments.
The second  part of the  paper  rarorts  or.  preliminary  results  from  a simple
cash-flow  model  designed  to illustrate  one  aspect  of the  mineral  contract:
how different  revenue generating  instruments  affect risk-sharing  between
two  parties--the  resource  owner  and the resource  extractor. In models  of
developed  economies  if the government  is owner  of the  mineral  resource  it
is assumed to be risk neutral since it is better able than a resource
extracting firm to diversify its portfolio and hedge  against risks
associated  with resource  extraction.  However,  mineral  dependent  developing
countries  with limited  access  to international  capital  markets,  may not  be
able  to hedge  adequately  against  financial  risks  arising  from  variations  in
commodity  prices,  exchange  rates,  interest  rates,  etc.  Even if financial
risks can be accommodated,  there  are non-financial  risks associated  with
mineral  development,  such as reserve  or operating  risks,  which can expose
the public revenue structure o' developing countries to shocks that
necessitate  difficult  adjustments. Stabilization  funds can buffer some
unevenness  in revenue  flows  but are not intended  to address  risks  arising
from  project  failure.
The purpose of the initial  simulations  is twofold.  First,  to
demonstrate  that  even  with  a  %ery simple  model  it is  possible  to illustrate
how different  instruments  affect  risk-sharing  between  the  producer  and  the
government;  and second,  to develop  a  practical  evaluation  tool that  can  be- iii  -
used in developing  countries  with limited  data.  All computations  are
feasible  on a personal  computer  using  a spreadsheet  with a risk simulator.
Government  analysts  applying  this type  of model to their  country's  unique
circumstances  will be able to understand  better the nature  of revenue
variability  under  different  contract  regimes.
Three typical  instruments  found  in mineral  contracts  are used in
the initial  analysis:  the ad valorem  royalty;  an income  tax  of the "free
equity"  type;  and a resource  rent tax (RRT). The  ad valorem  royalty  is a
charge  per unit of output  measured  as a percentage  of the nominal  price.
The type  of income  tax  used in the  analysis  is one in  which  there  is less
than  perfect  accrual  accounting. It is similar  in effect  to a production-
sharing  arrangement  with allowance  for  depreciation.  That is,  the  mineral
owner receives  a fixed  proportion  of current  book profits  for  each period
in  which  profits  less  accumulated  losses  carried  forward  are  positive. The
owner  receives  zero if losses  exceed  profits. Losses  are carried  forward
without  interest. The  RRT  scheme  carries  losses  forward  with interest  when
the net assessable  receipts  are negative.  The RRT scheme  provides  the
resource  owner  with positive  revenues  only  in  periods  where  the  accumulated
net  assessable  receipts  are  positive.
The instruments  are analyzed  one at a time to illustrate  -heir
effect  on the  risks  iacurred  by the  contracting  parties. A highly  stylized
mining  project  cash flow  is generated  by the  model  using  stochastic  prices
and  costs  with covariance  between  the  two.  The  model then  calculates  the
expected  value and  variance  for  each instrument's  flows  to the government
and  producer  using  a risk simulator. To simplify  the initial  analysis,  it
is assumed  that the geological  composition  of the deposit  and investment
costs are known with  certainty, a-id  that the extraction profile is- iv  -
determined es Senously (these restrictions  vill be relaxed in future
research).
When one party to a  contract  is risk-averse  and tbe'  other risk
neutral pareto efficiency  requires  that the risk be borne by the risk
neutral party.  The applied literature  has focussed  on the ranking  of
instruments  from the  perspective  of a risk-averse  firm and  a risk  neutral
government. The simple  model  used in this  paper  is able to simulate  these
results  well.  The  model can therefore  be applied  with some confidence  to
the ranking  of instruments  from  the  perspective  of a risk averse  resource
owning  government.  The  results  show  that  the  ranking  of the  instruments  by
government  can  be opposite  that  of the  firm's. This  is an important  issue
which has not been  widely addressed  in the literature. For example,  in
selecting an  instrument to address risk and uncertainty it is not
sufficient  to look only at the overall  variability  in a project's  cash
flow.  It is also important  to determine  the probability  that the net
present  value (NPV)  of the cash flow is positive.  For instance,  under  a
RRT, the government  receives  revenues  only in cases  where the  NPV of the
project  is positive. Thus,  if the  probability  is 60 percent  that the  NPV
of the  project  will  be positive,  the government  stands  a 40 percent  chance
of never receiving  any revenue.  The Government  will be forced  then to
incur adjustment  costs even though  it depletes  the mineral asset.  By
contrast,  both the royalty  and the income  tax  will lower  the risk to the
government  (the  former  more than  the  latter)  since  they  generate  a positive
NPV (revenue  flow)  to the government  in every  period that extraction  is
positive,  whether  or  not the  NPV  of the  project  is  positive. This  benefit
to the  government accrues at a  cost to the  firm as it lowers the
probability  that the NPV of the producer's  after-tax  cash flow will bepositive. To correctli  evaluate  the  risk  element  aasociated  with each
instrument,  however,  It  is necessary  to compare  instrumonts  holding  the
mean NPV shares  of tbe  contracting  parties  constant.  This  requirment
provides  a  convenient  and  practical  benhomark  for  determining  rates  for  the
different  instruments.  That  is,  if  the  goverment  negotiateo  a  40  percent
share  of  a  project's  expect-d  NPV,  then,  Siven the  paramoters  of  the  model,
it  must  set  the  royalty  rate  at  1  percent  or  the  nT  rate  at  13  percent
when there  is en approximately  40 percent  chence  that  the  project  will
fail,  and  at  3  percent  or 32  percent  respectively  if  the  probability  of
failure  is  much  lese  at  approximately  25  percent.  The lower the
probability  of  failure,  the  higher  the  mean  WPV  and  the  higher  the  rate
required  to  capture  40 percent  of  it.
When the  probability  of a positiv  NPV for  the  project  is leos
than  100  percent,  the probability  distributions  are also no longer
symnetric  about  the  mean.  As a result  the  varince Is  not  an adequate
measure  of  risk. In  such  situations,  particu *1.y  if  the  parties  are  risk-
averse  and the  various  instrumnts  treat  positive  and  negative  projc¢t
outcomes  differently,  it  is  better  to  use  second-order  stochastic  dominance
as  a  general  measure  to  rank  risk-sharing  features  of  revenue  Instruments
in  lieu  of  mean-variance  analysis.
Applying  these  techniques  to the simple  model enables  one  to
demonstrate  numerically  a  famillar  result  from  the  risk-sharing  literature;
namely,  if  both  parties  are  risk  averse,  they  will  not  necessarily  have  the
same  ranking  of  schemes,  holding  the  mean  returns  covetant.  Therefore,  in
general,  it  will  be necessary  for contracting  partzes  to trade  mean
expected  values  for  risk.  This Implies  that  no single  Instrument  (or  set
of  contract  terms)  can  be, * Sz  ,  a4wdvocated  as superior  for  *mneral- ve  -
dependent developing  countries.  Each country  has diffcarent  endowments
(portfolio  of initial  assets)  and faces different  risks.  These factors
must be taken into account when selecting instruments  and determining
rates.  In some cases royalties may be justified and should not be
systematically  deemphasized  as they  are iow. The  current  tendency  to focus
on  mean  values  in  mineral  project  evaluation  could  also  be  misleading  since
the  probability  is  zero  that  the  mean  value  will o-cur.
The advantage  of the practical  framework  being  developed  i  thIat
it will eventually  enable governments  to engage in this type of risk
analysis  at a relatively  low  cost  when designing  tax/payment  arrangements.
The results  reported  in this paper  are illustrative  and preliminary,  bott
they point in the direction where  future work is necessary such as
developing additional  tradeoffs,  empirically  estimating  parameters,  and
testing  the  simple  framework  in  applied  situations.INTRODUCTION
1.  Many developing  countries  are still  heavily  dependent  on mineral
extraction  to generate  fiscal  revenue  and to earn foreign  exchange.  In
over thirty  developing  countries,  mineral exports  account  for 25 to 75
percent  o. total  exports.  Unlike  other  export  oriented  sectors,  however,
mineral sectors tend to be enclaves  with few inter-industry  linkages.
Therefore,  for mineral  wealth to become  a major endowment  for financing
development  (in  other  words,  to facilitate  growth  and  diversification  of a
country's  asset  base),  it is  necessary  not  only  to extract  itl  but  also  to
ensure  a  positive  net fiscal  impact  over  and  above  that  required  to  replace
the  asset.
2.  An important  feature  of  mineral  sectors  is the  presence  of "rent",
in fact a variety of rents --  natural resource  rents,  Ricardian  relLts,
monopoly  rents,  windfall rents,  and so on. 2 This opens up options for
tax/payment  arrangements  not often  available  to non-mining  economies. It
is not surprising,  therefore,  that, on average, mining economies  have
public  revenue 3 to  GDP  ratios  approximately  twenty  five  percent  higher  than
non-mining  economies. 4 Or.  tne other  hand, there  are also constraints  on
I/ Mineral  wealth,  unlike  many  other  types  of economic  assets,  can  generate  in.ome
(liquidity)  only  if extracted. Since  extraction  is irreversible  (depletion),  it is
equivalent  to  selling  the  asset.
2/  Definitions  of these  terms  and a selected  set  of others  used  in  the  paper  are  provided
in  Appendix  4.
3/  Public  revenue  consists  of tax revenue  and  non-tax  revenue  (such  as fees,  royalties  and
other  payments).
4/ A considerable  number  of these  mineral  exporting  countries  collect  a  third  to  two  thirds
of  their  revenue  from  the  mineral  sector.-2-
how  much revenue  they  can extract  from  the  mining  sector.  If a country's
mining  taxes  are too  high relative  to competing  countries,  investment  may
choose  to shift  to the  relatively  lower  tax  countries. In practice  there
is a substantial  variation  in  the  ratio  of  mineral  revenue  to  mineral  value
added between countries (for example,  75 percent in Botswana  versus 25
percent  in Papua  New Guinea).  These differences  are significa-t. They
might  be explained  by differences  in the  composition  of the  mineral  base, 5
by phases in the life cycle of mineral extraction, 6 or by risk sharing
arrangements,  among  other possibilities. However,  no framework  based on
practical  criteria  has yet been developed  that can determine  whether the
revenue  instruments  are collecting  too  much or too  little  from  the  mineral
sector  or whether  the  revenue  instruments  in use  generate  signals  that  are
consistent  with the  overall  development  of the  sector,  as  well as,  the  rest
of the  economy.
3.  When minerals  form a  significant  proportion of a  developing
country's  asset  base, it is particularly  important  to have a framework  to
evaluate the adequacy of compensation schemes.  Are  these countries
collecting  enough  in return  for  the  depletion  of their  reserves? Are these
countries  carrying  too  much of the  risk?  This  paper  describes  the  work in
progress  in  developing  such  a framework.
4.  The first  part of the  paper  briefly  reviews  the issues  that  need
to  be included  in an  analyt. 1 framework  before  it can  be used to  evaluate
different  tax/payment  instruments.  The  second  part  of the  paper  reports  on
5/ Sane inerals  have a higher  rent  content  then  others  (for  example,  diamond  va  copper).
j/ At  earlier  pbasee  of  developcnt,  net  revenue  is  often  low  as  the  initial  outlay  _.n
capital  lntensive  Investments  Is  recouped through "expensaing or accelerated
depreciation.the developmant  of a module to examine the risk sharing features of
selected  revenue  instruments. 7 The  paper  concludes  with a summary  and a
set  of appendices.
PART  I
EVALUATING  TAX/PAYMENT  INSTRUMENTS  IN  THE  MINERAL  SECTOR:  SELECTED  ISSUES  8
5.  The literature  on mineral economics is vast and a number of
approaches  have  been  developed  to address  different  problems. Each  problem
is defined  narrowly  in order  to make it tractable. However,  tax/payment
instruments  are  ranked  differently  depending  on the  problem  addressed. For
example, cash flow taxes emerge as eminently suitable for collecting
economic  rent and for sharing  risk  when the contracting  parties  are risk
neutral  but not if they are risk averse.  Production  or profit sharing
contracts  are  good  for  generating  revenue  but  not  for  economizin-  on  costs.
Each result depends on assuming away some of the other issues  which,
however,  cannot  be igrored  in  practice.
6.  In many mineral dependent countries,  the government  holds the
mineral rights and enters into compensation  agreements  with public or
private  firms  that  will extract  the  resources. As a result,  in practice,
the  distinction  between  factor  payments  and  taxes  is increasingly  confused,
in part because a government  has a dual role as both the seller of
7/ This  does  not  imply  that  risk  sharing  can  necessarily  be  separated  from  the  other
elements  of  a contract.  Often,  all  contract  terms  are  not  strongly  separable.  For
instance,  the  level  of risk  borne  by all  parties  might  be a function  of  the  total
quantity  extracted  and  the  time  period  in  which  the  particular  quantities  are  extracted.
However,  an examination  of risk  sharing  in  Isolation  enables  a  comparison  of  particular
contract  terms  relative  to  an exogenous  distribution  of risks  and  returns.
I/ This section  Is based on Part  II of a  research  proposal  to develop  a framework  to
evaluate  mineral  :;yments/taxation  scheme  (Shalizi  and  Conrad,  1989).- 4  -
resour-ms  and the collector  of taxes.  This distinction  is more than a
semantic  one  as factor  payment  policies  are  judged  according  to  a different
set  of economic  criteria  than  are  tax  policies. From  this  perspective,  the
current  emphasis  on  modifying  wineral  tax/payment  arrangements  to  maximize
rent capture, without adequate evaluation of the opportunity costs
associated  with the  arrangements,  may be misplaced. Given  the  high degree
of risk and uncertainty  associated  with mineral  development,  determining
tax/payment  arrangements  is  further  complicated  by the  need  to develop  risk
sharing schemes between the government (as owner) and  the resource
extractors,  and the  need  to identify  externalities  affecting  other  sectors
in the  economy  that might  justify additional  modification of the
tax/payment  arrangements.
7.  As mineral  stocks  represent  part  of an  economy's  capital  endowment
at any point in time, it is important  that the government  compute  the
public  sector  selling  price  of its  reserves  and  evaluate  the  variability  of
its  returns  through  t'me. This  price  will  be based  on the  opportunity  cost
of extraction  and can include  up to three interrelated  elements  (Conrad
1989): (i) the scarcity  value of the finite reserves; (ii) pure risk
sharing;  and (iii)  the  general  equilibrium  opportunity  cost  of extraction.
The  government,  acting  as tax  collector,  can  then  assess  taxes.
8.  Thus, of the many issues  addressed  in the literature,  four have
been identified  as being particularly  important  in designing  a practical
framework  to evaluate  tax/payment  instruments:  (1)  how to design  natural
resource  rent  collection  schemes;  (2) how  to design  risk sharing
arrangements;  (3)  how  to incorporate  general  equilibrium  effects/adjustment
costs of the transition  to and from mineral  dependency;  and (4) how to
design  tax policy  in the  mineral  sector.  These issues  are distinct,  andlack of attention to the distinctions can lead to inappropriate  policies in
developing  economies,  such  as  overstating  the supposed  inefficiency of
extraction-related payments.  We now discuss each issue and place them in a
broader framework.
A.  What is Natural Resource Rent?
9.  A central feature of the literature on mineral economics has been
the  development  of  methods  for  the  determination  of  an  efficient
intertemporal extraction profile.  The time path of extraction is treated
as an endogenous variable.9 The general result of this literature is that
extraction  should  proceed  in  each  time  period  until  the  discounted
opportunity cost of extractior is equal between any two time periods.  This
result  defines  an allocative  suPPlY  price  based  on the rent accruing  to a
finite.  depleting  stock.  In Hotelling's  (1931)  original  formulation,  this
implied  that  the  time  path  of  the  supply  price  of the  resource  (opportunity
cost  of extracting  the  resource)  should  rise  at the  rate  of interest.
10.  Hotelling's  model  presumed  physical  exhaustion  of the resource  (a
rare occurrence in reality as increasing  marginal costs of extraction
usually  preclude  physical  exhaustion)  and constant  returns  to scale (zero
extraction  costs  are a special  case of constant  returns  to scale). With
the subsequent  incorporation  of stock effectsl 0 and increasing  marginal
costs  of extraction,  physical  resource  exhaustion  is  no longer  required  to
generate  positive  natural  resource  rents  in theoretical  models.  Economic
9/  This  differs  from  some  practical  approaches  where,  in order  to facilitate  and simplify
determination  of user costs/prices  for natural resources,  it is assumed  that the
extraction  profile  is  exogenous  (see  Schramm  1986).
IO/  Such  as changes  in  the  cumulative  stock  of  resources  due  to  exploration  efforts  or
depreciation.-6-
depletion  thus preempts  physical  depletion.  As a result,  the Hotelling
rule has evolved  into a more general  rule that states  that the resource
payment (in  other  words,  user cost or natural  resource  rent)  should  equal
the opportunity  cost of capital. While the shadow  price  of the resource
(the  "royalty"  as defined  by  Hotelling)  is  constant  in real  terms,  there  is
no longer  a requirement  that its time path should  rise at the rate of
interest. 11
11.  "Natural  resource  rent" (or  the price  of the  unprocessed  mineral
below  ground)  is the  difference  between  the  market  price  of the  unprocessed
mineral  above  ground  and the  marginal  cost  of extracting  it.  However,  the
more general  formulation  that  the  opportunity  cost  of  mineral  resources  is
the same as the opportunity  cost of capital  has led some authors  in the
1970s  to equate  "natural  resource  rent"  with "pure  economic  rent".  Such
treatment  de  facto  implies that  "natural resource rent" serves no
allocative  function  (as  it did  in  the  Hotelling  formulation).  As a result,
this rent can be captured  by charges  that are not related  to extraction
with no efficiency cost. This interpretation  has led to proposals to
maximize  rent collection,  favoring  income  related  charges  over royalties,
culminating  in instruments  such as the Garnaut  and Clunies-Ross  Resource
Rent  Tax (RRT).12
12.  It is inappropriate  to equate  "natural  resource  rent"  with pure
economic  rent.  Natural  resource  rent  is a price  and  serves  as an important
11/  See  Fisher  (1979).
12/  An RRT  is  essentially  a  cash  flow  tax  except  that,  in  the  case  of  losses,  an  RRT does
not  result  in  a  rebate  to  the  firm,  as  would  happen  in  a  cash  flow  tax,  but  allows
losses  to  be  carried  forward  at  the  rate  of  interest.  As noted  in  Lund (1985),  the  RRT
was  origiually  proposed  as  a  complete  mineral  payment/tax  system.  In  practice,  it  has
also  been used  in  conjunction  with  other  instruments.-7-
market signal  to ownerlproducers  indicating  how to allocate  the resource
intertemporally  so that they can be indifferent  about  whether  to extract
now  or later. As a first  approximatlion,  the  price  represents  the  "scarcity
rent" arising from supply  restrictions  on a finite  resource  of uniform
quality  and  has nothing  to do  with Ricardian  differential  rents1 3 or other
forms  of economic  rent  based  on  monopoly,  windfalls  or other  factors. As a
price of an input,  it is an element  of the  cost of production  and  not an
intramarginal  rent.  Without  knowing  the shadow  price of extraction,  no
party,  owner  or producer  can  determine  an  efficient  extraction  profile. It
might be possible to reduce this stream of payments to a  lump-sum
contemporaneous  payment,  like  the  valuation  of corporate  stock.  However,
it must be emphasized  that the source of this equality  stems from the
computation  of the shadow  price  of reserves  on a  Rer  unit basis. That  is,
only  after  determining  the  natural  resource  rent  or price  can  one  determine
the  present  value  of any  deposit.
13.  A related  strand  of  this  literature  has  focused  on auctions  as the
best  means for the owner  of the resource  to capture  the present  value of
the resource due to him as the holder of the property rights.  This
approach  is applicable  in principle  both to private  and public  owners  of
the resource.  (It  is used, for example,  by the  U.S. in leasing  offshore
tracts).  Note  that  in practice,  however,  if there is inadequate
competition  in the  auction  bidding  process,  the  government  has  to determine
a reservation  price  for  the  resource.1 4 This  can  be done  using  a portfolio
13/  Op cit.
14/  Recently  bonus  bids  or  auctions  have  also  been  contested  on  theoretical  grounds  vhen
sovereign  risk  and  moral  hazard  problems  are  incorporated  into  the  analysis  (Nellor  and
Robinson,  1984)--problems  more  prevalent  in developing  countries.  If subsequent
goverrments  are  aot  bound  by  auction  results,  then  a  stream  of  payments (in  the  form  of
royalties)  may be superior  to  collecting  the  net  present  value  at  one  tlme  in  an
auction.- 8 -
or factor of production approach to analyze the efficient  use of the
natural  resource.
14.  In a portfolio  approach,  natural  resources  are  one  component  of an
economy's  capital  stock. Without  a competitive  return,  no party,  including
the  government,  would  be  willing  to  own  and  husband  this  stock. Thus,  in  a
portfolio  type model, "natural  resource  rent" serves  as the return  from
investing  in ownership  of stocks  in the  ground  relative  to the return  from
investing  in other  types  of capital. In effect,  this  is  what is implied  by
the  original  Hotelling  Rule.  Minerals  in the  ground  must be extracted  to
generate cash through time.  This time path of cash withdrawals is
calibrated  so that  the  owner  of  the  stock  captures  a  return  just  sufficient
to hold  reserves  for  future  use.  Again,  "natural  resource  rent"  serves  an
important  allocative  function. This  allocative  function  is  implicit  in the
demonstration  by Feldstein  (1977)  in which he changed the allocation  of
capital  within  and  among  sectors  to prove  that  attempts  to "tax"  this  rent
can  be inefficient.
15.  In a factor  of production  approach,  "natural  resource  rent"  is the
return  to the owner from a factor  of production  and thus constitutes  an
efficiency  based payment (Conrad  1989).  That is, the owner of mineral
rights  is the  owner  of a productive  input,  not output. To produce  mineral
outputs, labor, capital and mineral inputs  are required.  The cost of
reproducible  capital and labor are included in the expenses that are
incurred  in the  production  of mineral  outputs. The  cost  of mineral  inputs
should  also  be included. This  point  has  been  a source  of some  confusion  as
many  theoretical models  used  in  the  economic  analysis of mineral
development  do not make a distinction  between  the resource  owner and the
producer.  This distinction  is conceptually  important  because "natural-9-
resource  rent"  is the payment  made by the producer  to the rwner  for the
purchase  of the  resource  input  (even  if they  are  legally  the  same  entity  in
practice). Furthermore,  this  efficiency  payment  is defined  on a per unit
basis,  just like the  wage rate for labor  or the rental  value of capital.
Thus, like the supplier  of any factor,  the resource  owner  must determine
how to sell  his inventory  intertemporally  and  what opportunity  costs  exist
to establish  the  relevant  reservation  wage for  this  factor  of  production.
16.  In summary,  what these  different  approaches  to shadow  pricing  the
resource have in common is that in all cases the extractioLi  related
payments  serve  an important  allocative  function  both for  the  resource  owner
and the economy as a whole.  Such payments (suitably  calibrated)  are
efficient  and do not distort  extraction  decisions.  The payment for the
sale of a ton of minerals in the ground  should  not be conceptually  any
different  from  the  payment  for  the  sale  of  any  other  input.
17.  Because  of this,  recent  attempts  to equate  natural  resource  rent
with pure economic rent have been problematic,  leading  to poor policy
analysis.  In particular,  the current  emphasis  on income  related  charges
has  concentrated  the  debate  on the  maximum  amount  a country  can  receive  for
its minerals, with  little regard to intertemporal  and intersectoral
opportunity  costs  or to the risks  to the country  associated  with mineral
extraction. A return  to a more appropriate  factor  payment  policy  might
force decisionmakers  to examine the costs as well as the benefits  of
mineral  developments.  More importantly,  regardless  of the  ultimate  method
employed by a government to collect the value of its mineral wealth,
renewed emphasis on the supply price of the resource  will serve as a
benchmark  for  evaluating  alternative  policies.- 10  -
B.  Risk  Sharing
18.  Given the inherent  uncertainty regarding the size of mineral
stocks  before  exploration  and of the revenue  and cost streams  associated
with mineral  development  after  exploration,  risk sharing  arrangements  are
important in the rational development  of mineral tax payments/sch-mes.
This is particularly  important  where  markets  for  contingent  claims  across
different  states  of nature  are neither  complete  nor perfect.  One of the
major innovations  in recent  mineral  contracts,  in the petroleum  sector  in
particular,  is the  development  of risk  sharing  contracts  or contracts  with
significant  risk sharing  aspects.  In general,  these innovations  require
the  mineral  producing  firm  to surrender  part  of the  "net  profits"  from  the
positive  cash flows  that are generated  after  exploration  and development
costs are  recouped.  Theoretical  support for such schemes was  first
established  in an important  paper by Leland (1978). Leland  demonstrated
that  an extraction  related  charge  (for example, a  royalty) is an
inefficient  method  for  risk  sharing.
19.  Subsequent  analysis of risk sharing between two risk neutral
parties  has shown  that in the case of mean preserving  spreads (in  other
words, for equal expected levies),  profit sharing is a more effective
method  for spreading  risk,  followed  by royalties  and then  fixed  fees (such
as bonus  bids).  However,  in the case  of a small,  risk averse  firm and a
large,  risk  neutral  (diversified)  government  (such  as the  U.S. or Canada),
royalties could be superior to profit sharing  when there is positive
covariance  between  uncertain  revenues  and costs  (Sebenius  and Stan 1982).
In the case of developing  countries,  the issues  are slightly  different  as
the contract is likely  to be between  a large  multinational  firm and a
small, poorly diversified  developing  country (Garnaut  and Clunies  Ross- 11 -
1975).  The ranking of instruments, however, is likely to depend again on
the covariance between uncertain revenues ar.d  costs.
20.  Mineral reserves have uncertain present values, as does labor in a
dynamic labor market.  This implies that the Hotelling formulation, while
instructive,  may  not  be  appropriate  in  all  situations  where  physical
capital, labor and reserves are owned by different parties and where there
are risks that must be borne by some (or all) parties.  In such cases, two
prices might be computed, one for the real wage  for minerals and one for
the price of risk bearing.  Mineral owners and contractors, have developed
numerous methods whereby both risk and return can be combined into a single
payment, again as in contracts between employers and employees.
21.  The fixed  wage rate is itself  one type of risk sharing device with
the particular property that the firm will continue to employ that factor
as long as it is profitable to do so.  Thus, the input seller bears the
risk that his fixed price is too high relative to the value of his marginal
product as dictated by either current (or future) market conditions.  In
minerals, such unemployrent of factors is sometimes called "high grading".
However, the use of a fixed wage rate is not irrational for the mineral
owner as long as the opportunity cost of selling additional inputs is not
zero.  Rationality in this context includes weighing the potential gains
against the risk of unemployment and will depend on the risk preferences of
the input seller.
22.  In general, not only must risk sharing be evaluated in the proper
context, but specific instruments  might have to be used to accommodate risk
relative to other costs associated with mineral ownership and development.
That  is,  it  may  not  always  be  efficient  to  design  a  single  payment
structure (for example, a profit sharing contract or a resource rent tax- 12 -
[RRT])  both to capture  the natural  resource  rent and to provide  for risk
sharing. 15 The ability  of a particular  economy  to bear the significant
risks  associated  with such  schemes  as  profit  sharing  or the  RRT  will depend
on the particular  attributes  of the economy,  for example,  the degree  of
existing  diversification,  the relative  size of the  mineral  sector  and the
overall  level of wealth.  It is necessary,  therefore,  to price  the risk.
To our  knowledge,  there  is no theoretical  demonstration  that in general  it
is efficient  for small,  poorly  diversified  developing  economies  to bear a
disproportionate  amount  of risk  relative  to large  diversified  multinational
firms.
23.  Thus,  the  high  amount  of risk  bearing  currently  undertaken  by some
countries (for example, Gambia and Nigeria) may  be  the inadvertent
consequence  of failing to differentiate  between risk bearing and the
collection  of natural resource  rent, both at the margin and in total.
Willingness  to  bear risk  is a form  of insurance  provided  by the  country  to
the firm,  while natural  resource  rent is the factor  payment  to which the
country is entitled  by right of property  ownership.  The payments  are
conceptually  different,  and practical  policy advice  should  be directed
towards  clearly  distinguishing  these  concepts  and  to developing  alternative
instruments  where  necessary. These  differences  are important  as a country
that adopts  an RRT, profit sharing  or income  related  scheme  exclusively
could  have all its  natural  resource  endowment  extracted,  incur  significant
15/  For  instance,  the  RRT  propob.)d  by  Garnaut  and  Clunies-Ross  (1983)  is  designed  to  capture
rent (regardless  of the nature of these rents).  It handles  risk to the firm  by
excluding  from  the tax base a high rate  of return  on investment  (no  distinctions  are
made between  discount  rates  before  and after exploration  or between  returns  on total
investment  versus  equit-  investments). However,  neither  the RRT nor other  means of
capturing  supposed  natural  resource  rent  directly  address  the  issue  of risk  bearing  by
the  country  or  the  price  of this  risk.- 13 -
transition  costs  and  never  collect  a  positive  payment  for  its  ownership  of
tbe  resource  endowment.
C.  Economy  Wide Effects
24.  Much of the development  literature  has emphasized  the enc'sve
nature  of  mineral  developments  and  that  the  primary  linkage  between  natural
resource  production  and the remainder  of the economy  is fiscal (Nankani
1979).  This is true to a certain  extent,  but as another  strand  of the
literature  has noted, important indirect  production  linkages  can arise
through factor  markets and through  changes  in key macro prices such as
exchange  rates,  interest  rates  and  wage rates (Corden  1984). This occurs
most noticeably  when significant  mineral deposits  are disaovered1 6 that
increase  an economy's  capital stock in a sector  specific  way.  In this
case,  there  will  be a change  in the  economy's  comparative  advantage  even  if
there are no other direct linkages  with the rest of the economy.  For
instance, signi icant mineral discoveries can change the nature of
comparative  advantage  from traditional  exports (such  as agriculture)  to
mineral  exports. If the country  is  a price  taker,  one can  expect  that,  as
mineral development  proceeds,  mineral exports  will rise and traditional
exports will fall (holding  world prices constant).  This process  also
operates  in reverse.  That is, as minerals  are depleted  and production
costs  rise,  the  economy's  comparative  advantage  might  return  to traditional
exports (or to output from other sectors into which the economy has
16!  The  significant  scale  of the discovery  relative  to the  size  of the  economy  is  important
in  determining  vhetber  or  not  to incorporate  general  equilibrium  effects. For genuinely
marginal  finds,  partial  equilibrium  analysis  is  sufficient  to  determine  the  endogenous
extraction  profile.- 14 -
diversified). Such incremental  changes  in comparative  advantage  due to
mineral  developments  are  one  component of  "Dutch Disease".  This
substitution  effect  is generally  complemented  by an income  effect  since  a
mineral  discovery  increases  the  economy's  wealth. It is even  possible  for
changes  in the nature  of demand (for  example,  a rise in demand  for  non-
tradables)  to occur  when there is no change  in the economy's  production
possibilities.
25.  To the extent  that such changes  in comparative  advantage  result
from  well functioning  markets,  "Dutch  Disease"  is  not a disease;  that is,
it is  not  an inefficient  outcome. However,  markets  do contain  friction  and
adjustment costs from one type of comparative  advantage  to another  as
capital and labor previously employed in one export sector (say, from
traditional  exports initially  to mineral exports  subsequently)  flows to
another  sector. This  can  become  a problem  for  the  economy  if the  period  of
mineral  dependency  is  relatively  short.  It must,  therefore,  be
incorporated  in any framework determining  the rate of extraction and
compensation  arrangements. In such cases,  governments  must be concerned
about developing  mineral extraction profiles consistent  with the more
general  benefits  of joint  outputs  (minerals  plus  other  outputs)  rather  than
simply maximizing  mineral values.  As mineral exhaustion causes a
continuous  change  in the nature  of comparative  advantage  (in  other  words,
in  the marginal  rate of transformation) through time, the optimal
extraction  profile  for  the  resource  owner  will  be affected.
26.  It is thus misleading  to think  of mineral  development  as truly
enclave  in  nature. Even in  cases  where  the  major  source  of  project  finance
and  skilled  labor  is external, mineral  developments  may  generate
significant  costs to the economy at the margin.  This should  not be a- 15 -
surprise. Rather,  it is simply  a restatement  of  the  fact  "that  there  is  no
free lunch".  An economy must  adjust to changes in its comparative
advantage in minerals.  This implies that from a  general equilibrium
perspective, the government  must -ompute  the cost of increased  current
mineral  output  as the  value of output  foregone  in other  sectors. Thus,  a
supply  curve  for  resource  sales  (a  scarcity  value)  can  be generated  even  in
cases  where the mineral  is not physically  exhausted. That is, the  value
added  of increased  sales  from  mineral  inventories  shouid  be equal to the
marginal value of output foregone in other sectors  before  the country
decides  to increase  extraction. Thus,  the supply  curve  of resource  sales
is  not  perfectly  inelastic  either  within  or  bet-'een  time  periods.
27.  In the  presence  of significant  adjustment  costs  in the  transitions
to and from mineral dependence,  countries  with major mineral endowments
might  need to attribute  the  proceeds  from  sales  between  two  cateories of
compensation--one  for the finite  nature  of the mineral  and the other for
the  cost  of foregone  output  in other  sectors. Proper  attribution  of these
costs  at the margin is important  so that the country  is compensated  for
them and so that the asset sales profile is adjusted until exogenous
marginal  gains equal endogenous  marginal  costs.  If such costs are not
recovered,  then the  benefits  from  mineral  ownership  and  development  may be
lost.
D.  Tax Policy
28.  One means of capturing rents of any form is to use national
taxation.  However,  in an economy  where mineral  rights are held by the
state, "taxing the natural resource rents" will merely amount to the
government  taxing  itself  if the  natural  resource  pricing  policy  is  properly- 16 -
designed.  In reality,  government  must wear two hats--tax  collector  and
natural  resource  owner.  Thus,  there  must be a clear  delineation  of the
role  of taxes  and  efficiency  prices  to  ensure  consistent  policy.
29.  The large  literature  on natural  resource  taxation  (Dasgupta,  Heal,
Stiglitz  1980;  Conrad  and Hool 1981;  Slade 1982;  Nellor 1984;  Heaps and
Helliwell 1985) has demonstrated  that output related charges (such  as
royalties and export taxes)  employed  as taxes  may generate  significant
efficiency  costs. Such instruments  can  result  in "high  grading"  or in the
premature  closure  of marginal  mines.  However,  as already  noted,  a charge
by the owner for the sale of minerals  is no more a tax than the wage
charged  by a worker  for his labor.  The allocative  incentives  created  by
different  types  of payments  must  be evaluated  relative  to the  intention  of
the policy.  There is no necessitY  to aRRlv  the 'neutrality"  norm of tax
analysis to those extraction related charges designed to compensate
government  for  its  ownership  of  mineral  riRhts.1 7
30.  Many developing country governments  have begun to rely more
heavily  on income  related  charges  in the mineral sector.  As a result,
general income tax rules are superseded  and modified for the mineral
sector. This  creates  difficulties  in  comparing  effective  rates  of taxation
(both  average  and  marginal)  across  sectors. For  instance,  it is difficult
to  measure  the  marginal  effective  tax  rate  unless  the  resource  is  correctly
costed  and deducted  from the corporate  tax  base  with adjustments  for risk
sharing provisions.  If the opportunity costs of mineral sales are
understated  (through,  for  example,  inadequate  deductions  for  the  legitimate
171 The  use  of terms  such  as the  Resource  Rent  Tax further  confuses  the  issue. A scheme  to
capture  100  percent  of  the "natural  resource  rent"  for  the  owner  £s  not  a  tax at  all as
established  by Hotelling. It is important  for governments  to set a price  for  mineral
extraction  before  different  taxes  or  other  instruments  are  employed.- 17 -
cost  of mineral  inputs),  the true  burden  of taxes  will be overstated. On
the other  hand,  if provisions  in the tax code to compensate  for risk are
treated  as deductions,  the tax burden  will be understated. Some recent
studies  of developed  economies  (Kemp  1987;  Boadway,  Bruce,  McKenzie,  Mintz
1987)  have  found  that  current  tax/payment  schemes  are  not  even  efficient  at
collecting  rent  as the  mineral  sector  is  subsidized  at the  margin  (negative
marginal effective tax rates).  These findings  are disturbing  as they
suggest  that,  despite  the  high rents  in the sector,  the incentives  in the
fiscal system are biased in favor of heavier investment  in minerals
relative  to other sectors.  Little  empirical  work has yet been done for
developing  economies  along  these  lines.
31.  Mineral tax policy should  definitely  be separated  conceptually,
and  possibly  in  practice,  from  natural  resource  pricing  policy  (user  costs)
and risk sharing arrangements.  To increase intersectoral  neutrality,
mineral  developments  should  be taxed  in a  manner  similar  to other  sectors.
Sector specific mineral features should be addressed through otter
instruments. Thus, general  taxation  instruments  that cut across  sectors
should  not be modified  to become  a means of collecting  payment for the
resource  as a factor  input,  of sharing  risks  or of compensating  for  general
equilibrium  effects, thus having to do double duty.  Therefore,  when
objectives  are not perfectly correlated,  it may be preferable to use
multiple  instruments  and  to  match  each  instrument  to an objective.- 18 -
PART II
AN ILLUSTRATION OF RISK SHARING THROUGH DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS
32.  The second part of this paper describes preliminary results from a
simple cash flow module18 designed to illustrate one aspect of the mineral
contract: how different revenue generating instruments affect risk-sharing
between two parties--the resource owner and the resource extractor.  One
purpose of these simulations is to demonstrate the utility of simple  models
as practical evaluation tools.  All computations are feasible on a personal
computer using a spreadsheet with a risk simulator.  The presentation of
this part is in three sections: in Sr-^tion  A the instruments selected for
simulation  are  described;  in  Section  B,  the  ranking  criteria  and
methodology; and in Section C, the results.
A.  Selected Mineral Tax/Payment  Arrangements
33.  Three typical instruments found in mineral contracts are used in
the initial analycis--the ad valorem royalty, an income tax of the "free
equity" type and a resource rent tax (RRT).
18/  Despite substantial  advances  in the theoretical  literature,  there is at present  no
practical  analytical  framework  with  which  to analyze  tradeoffs  or to  determine  the rate
structure  for the  different  instruments  used  to collect  public  revenue  from  the  mineral
sector. Work  is  in  progress  to  develop  such  a framework.  The  framework  will  consist  of
a  number  of  modules. The first  module  will  be  used  to  compute  a price  for  the  resource
that  is unadjusted  for risk.  This  will generate  an endogenous  extraction  profile  for
the resource. In  the  next  module,  the  risk  sharing  features  of  the revenue  instruments
will be evaluated,  taking the extraction  profile as exogenously  determined.  The
preliminary  form  of this  module  is described  in the section  above. Other  modules  will
address  general  equilibrium  effects  and intersectoral  taxation,  for example.  To be
practical,  it should  be possible  to operate  the modules  separately. To be useful,
however,  they  will  have  to  be  mutually  consistent.- 19  -
(a) Ad Valorem  Royalties
34.  An ad valorem royalty is a charge per unit of output  measured as a
percentage  of price.  Unlike a per unit or  "specific" rate charge, the
resource  owner  now  participates  in price  risk.19 The  extensive  (and
exclusive) use of royalties to capture the return from mineral extraction
and  to  share risk has  declined during  the past 20  years  in developing
countries.20 Economists  have  contributed  to  this  decline  by  showing
separately  that,  as a  tax,  ad valorem  royalties can  distort production
decisions to result in inefficient resource use (Conrad  and Hool 1981) and
that fixed rate royalties  may not be optimal as a first best method of risk
sharing  (Leland  1978).  First  best  risk  sharing  is essentially  the
provision of optimal (mutual) insurance.  The fact that a fixed percentage
royalty  is not  optimal  results from the  simple fact that  the insurance
agent (the government in this case) does not compensate the insured in bad
states  of  the world  (negative  present  values). 2 1  Both  criticisms are
justified subject to a couple of caveats.  First, if royalties are designed
to collect  the value  of  the resource they can function as  a user cost
rather than as a tax.  As a reflection of the opportunity cost of mineral
extraction from the resource owner's point of view, the royalty would be a
charge leading to the efficient allocation of resources rather than a tax
leading  to  the  inefficient  allocation  of  resources.  Second,  given
monitoring  costs  (on both  sides of the  contract), administrative costs,
19/  The value of this  payment  to the resource  owner  varies  both  with the volume  and the
price  of the output.  This  variation  is perfect  in the case of a fixed percentage
royalty  but  not in  the  case  of a  progressive  rate  royalty.
20/  It  is still  extensively  used  by  private  mineral  owners  in  the  United  States.
21/  This  is equivalent  to purchasing  fire  insurance  where the insured  pays  a nonnegative
premium  for  fire  insurance  but  receives  no payment  even  when  the  house  burns  down.- 20 -
asymmetric  information  and other  market friction,  it is possible  that a
royalty  used as a factor  payment  is still  in contention  as a second  best
policy  for  risk  sharing. 22
(b) An Income  Tax  of the  "Free  Equity"  Type
35.  A second  type of compensation  scheme  for  mineral  owners  has  been
labeled  "free  equity." In this  scheme,  the  owner  receives  a proportion  of
the  stock  issued  from  formulating  the  project. In  other  words,  the  mineral
owner  receives  a fixed  proportion  of current  book profits  for  each period
in which  profits  less  accumulated  losses  exceed  profits.  Exploration  and
development  costs are immediately  expensed  (written  off) and losses  are
carried  forward  without  interest.
36.  Free  equity  is actually  a misnomer. Mineral  production  requires
two  types  of capital--non-renewable  minerals  in  the  ground  and  reproducible
physical  capital. The  asset  base is,  therefore,  the  summation  of the  value
of  minerals  in the  ground  plus the  value  of the  other  types  of capital. A
free  equity  share  of,  say,  40 percent  is  thus  effectively  a statement  about
the proportion  of the  value of mineral  assets  to total  capital  (minerals
plus physical  capital).  From this perspective,  free equity is no more
"free"  than an entrepreneur  with an idea for a new product  who forms a
corporation  with owners of physical capital and receives in return a
proportion  of the  common  stock. 23
22/  Unlike  windfall  profits,  a royalty  is paid for each  and every  ton of ore extracted.
Thus,  there  is  a tangible  relationship  between  extraction  and  payment. A resource  firm
might prefer  such  a payment  system  to a windfall  profit  scheme,  for example,  if the
likelihood  increases  with the latter  scheme  that  the resource  owner  might  stop  selling
the resource,  nationalize  production  or seek  new contract  terms  because  the resource
owner  observes  extraction  for  several  years  with  no  compensation  and  with  only  a promise
of  future  compensation.
23/  The value  of the reserves  in the  ground  (as  well  as the  value  of the idea)  may not  be
known  with certainty. However,  this  does not preclude  the contracting  parties  from
agreeing  on  an initial  ex-ante  division  of the  total  returns  to  capital.- 21  -
37.  In  such  an  agreement, both  parties expect  to  receive the  risk
adjusted return to their capital bases.  If perfect income accounting were
possible, one method  to do  this would be  to repay invested capital via
depreciation and depletion deductions, and to charge the respective capital
balances the appropriate interest charge.  In actual situations, the return
to equity (both  minerals and physical capital) is based on cash flow after
book depreciation (and perhaps book depletion) and the opportunity cost of
funds is not a charge against income.  Thus, in practice, the 40 percent
ownership interest in the present value does not necessarily correspond to
40 percent  of  the  cash  flow  due  to  timing  and  other  book  accounting
differences.  Like the purchaser of any common stock, the mineral owner has
limited  downside  risk with  free  equity.  If the present value  of  the
project  is  -egative,  the  resource  owner's  liability is limited  to the
initial  invested  capital.  This  can  affect  the  risk-sharing  structure
relative  to  contracts  where  equity's liability  is not  limited as  in a
general partnership.24
38.  Common production sharing agreements are akin to free equity in
terms  of  their  risk  sharing properties.  Production  sharing agreements
generally  allow  an  investor  to  recover  the  capital  investment  (in
undiscounted  terms)  using  immediate  expensing,  and  allow losses  to be
carried forward without limit before the resource owner receives any share
24/  It is well known that pure unlimited liability  shares  are efficient  risk sharing
devices.  However,  whether  such  an arrangement  is optimal  in a particular  situation
depends  on the distribution  of possible  outcomes  and the  preferences  of the partners.
Few  arrangements  in  pure  form  are  found  in  practice  and  with  good  reason. Part  of  the
contract  structure  must include  the opportunity  cost  of the resource  owner  and some
positive  payment  may  also  be required  to  compensate  the resource  owner  for  risk.- 22 -
of  the  gross  (or net)  proceeds.  Once  the  capital  is  recovered,  the
resource owner gets a specific share of the net cash flow (either in cash
or in kind).
(c)  Resource Rent Tax or Excess Profit Charges
39.  Some countries have contract terms that specify that the return to
mineral ownership should be an increasing function of some measure of ex-
post profitability.  The most famous type of charge is the Resource Rent
Tax (RRT) advocated by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1975; 1979; 1983).25  Tiis
charge is zero if the net present value  of the project is  less than or
equal to zero, and is positive  (at proportional or progressive rates) if
the net  present value  is positive.26 To  a  developing country that  is
relatively poor but rich in resources and that anticipates using mineral
resources to finance development and diversification, this charge can have
significant  risk  as  it  is possible  for  the  mineral  asset  base  to  be
exhausted without ever generating a single payment to the resource owner.
40.  A larger array of contract arrangements are described in Appendix
1 with  their  risk  sharing  properties  and  structure.  The  use  of  any
particular instrument (or combination of instruments)  will depend upon the
nature of the mineral deposit, the general structure  of risk in the project
and  the  extent  of  risk  aversion  of  the  parties. 27 To  make  better
decisions,  it  is  important  for decisionmakers to  be aware  of  the  risk
25!  Windfall  charges  and  excess  profit  charges  are  used  in Indonesia,  Papua  New Guinea,  and
some  provinces  in  Canada.
26/  The discount  rate  used for the purpose  of computing  the present  value is generally  a
contract  term.
27/ If  both  parties  are risk  neutral,  then  the  issue  of  risk  sharing  would  be irrelevant  as
all decisions  would be based  on the expected  values  with no regard  for the expected
variation.- 23 -
sharing properties of each instrument  and how the instruments rank relative
to  some  criterion  of  risk  bearing.  The  next  section  describes  a
metholology  that  can  facilitate  such  an  analysis.  It  illustrates how
rankings can be developed for each party.
B.  Ranking  Criteria  and  Methodology
41.  Ranking Criteria:  If both parties to a contract  were risk neutral
or if markets for contingent claims were complete and perfect, the-e would
be no need to examine and rank the risk sharing properties of instruments.
Because markets for such claims do not always exist and one or both parties
to  a  contract may  be  risk-averse, it is necessary to evaluate the risk
sharing properties of tax/payment instruments.
42.  When one party to a contract is risk neutral and the other risk-
averse,  pareto  efficiency  requires that the  risk be  borne by  the risk
neutral party (that is, the one who is better able to carry the risk).  In
the  analytic  literature  used  to  rank  pure  forms  of  tax  and  contract
instruments that spread risk (Sebenius and Stan, 1982) it is assumed that
the  agent--the  resource  extracting  firm--is  risk-averse  and  the
principal--the government--is risk neutral.  This assumption is generally
borne out in analysis of developed economies as the government is better
able than a resource extracting firm to diversify its portfolio and hedge
against the risks associated with resource extraction.  In such cases, it
is sufficient for the government to rank projects based on their expected
value, that is the mean net present value.  (This is relatively straight-
forward and is common practice in project analysis).28 The results of the
28/  Note  that  the  most  likely  value  (the  mode)  will  be  the  same  as  the  expected  value  (the
mean)  when  the  probability  of  different  outcomes  is  normally  distributed.  However,  when
the two  measures  of central  tendency  deviate,  it is the  mean  that  is the  more
appropriate  statistic  for  risk  analysis.- 24  -
analytic  literature  show charges  on income  (such  as an income  tax) to be
superior to charges on output (such as a royalty)  which are in turn
superior  to fixed  charges  (bonus  bids).  A sufficient  condition  to obtain
these risk sharing rankings  is to have statistical  independence  between
prices  and  costs  as noted  by Thon and  Thorlund-Petersen  (1987). If prices
and costs  are statistically  dependent,  however,  the  ranking  may or may  not
hold.  Thus  when there  is covariance  between  prices  and costs,  simulation
techniques  are  necessary  to rank  instruments.
43.  When there  is uncertainty  and returns  are  normally  distributed,  a
conventional  way of describing  the  risk  associated  with an investment  is  to
specify the variance of the distribution of  returns in addition to
specifying  the  mean. Using  this  mean  variance  analysis,  instruments  can  be
ranked  by a pair of values--mean  and  variance.  The instrument  with the
highest  mean and lowest  variance  is to be preferred. When an instrument
does  not dominate  both  statistics,  it is still  possible  to rank those  with
one statistic  in common. That is, for  a given  risk (holding  the  variance
constant)  one can select  the instrument  with the highest  return  (highest
mean value),  or for a given  return  (holding  the mean value constant)  one
can select  the instrument  with the lowest  risk (lowest  variance).  The
ranking can be made independent  of the unit of measurement  by using a
standardized  measure  of the  project's  variability  known  as the  coefficient
of variation  (standard  deviation  divided  by the  mean).  Ranking  by a pair
of values (mean  and  variance)  becomes  problematic  when one instrument  has
both a higher  mean (desirable)  and a higher  variance (undesirable)  than
another  instrument.  In such  cases,  the  criterion  of first  order  stochastic
dominance can be used to rank instruments. 29 With this criterion,  an
instrument  X  is ranked superior to an instrument  Y  if X's  cumulative
29/  Actually  it  is  not  the  instrument  itself  but  the  value  of  the  asset  associated  with  the
use  of the  instrument  that  is  ranked.- 25  -
probability distribution always lies to the right of Y's.  This is
equivalent  to saying  that  for  any  arbitarily  chosen  threshold  w*, there  is
a greater  probability  that  the  return  Wi is smaller  than  w* for  instrument
Y than  for  instrument  X.
44.  These  criteria  cannot  be used,  however,  if the  contracting  parties
are risk averse  or the probability  distribution  of their returns  is not
normal.  Mineral dependent  developing  countries,  with limited  access to
international  capital  markets,  may  not be able to hedge  adequately  against
financial risks arising from variations in such factors as commodity
prices,  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates. Even if financial  risks  can  be
accommodated, there are non-financial risks associated with mineral
development,  such  as reserve  or  operating  risks,  that  can  expose  the  public
revenue structure of developing  countries to shocks that necessitate
difficult  adjustments. Stabilization  funds  can  buffer  some  unevenness  in
revenue  flows  but are not intended  to address  risks  arising  from  project
failure.  It is, therefore,  more appropriate  to treat mineral  dependent
developing  countries  as risk  averse. This  can  have  a bearing  on the  choice
of instrument  and  the  setting  of rates.
45.  It is important to note that in evaluating the risk sharing
characteristics  of an instrument,  it is not sufficient  to look  only  at the
overall  variability  in a project's  cash flow.  It is also necessary  to
determine  the  probability  that  the  net  present  value  (NPV)  of the  cash flow
is positive. For instance,  under  an RRT,  the goveranent  receives  revenues
only in cases where the NPV of the project is positive.  Thus, if the
probability  is 60 percent  that  the  NPV  of the  project  will be  positive,  the
government  stands  a 40  percent  chance  of never  receiving  any revenue. The
government  will then be forced  to incur  adjustment  costs even though  it
depletes  the  mineral  asset.  By contrast,  both the royalty  and the income- 26 -
tax will lower the risk to the government (the former  more than the latter)
because they generate a positive NPV  (revenue flow) to the government in
every period in which extraction is positive,  whether or not the NPV of the
project is positive.  This benefit to the government accrues at a cost to
the firm as it lowers the probability that the NPV of the producer's after
tax cash flow will be positive.  When the probability of a positive NPV for
the project is less than 100 percent and prices and costs are not normally
distributed, the probability distributions are no  longer symmetric about
the mean.  As a result, the variance is not an adequate measure of risk.
Thus,  mean  variance  analysis  does  not  correctly  rank  risk  sharing
instruments  when the agents have concave utility functions (in  other words,
are risk averse) or when  the frequency distribution of outcomes for each
party is not symmetric (or  both).
46.  Therefore,  to  evaluate  the  risk  element  associated  with  each
instrument correctly, it is necessary to compare instruments holding the
mean  NPV  shares  of  the  contracting  parties  constant  (mean  preserving
spread).  This implies that the risk sharing issue becomes one in which the
parties select among alternative distributions of outcomes with a constant
mean  return.  Thus, in situations where the contracting parties are risk
averse  and  the various  instruments treat positive  and negative project
outcomes differently, it is better to use second order stochastic dominance
as  a more  general  measure30 to  rank  risk  sharing  features  of  revenue
instrulments.
47.  One distribution, f(x), of uncertain outcomes is said to dominate
another distribution, g(y), if:
30/  In  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify  the  utility  function  of the  agents.- 27 -
rwi
(1)  |  CGy  (W)  - Fx (W)]  dW  - 0 for  all  W
J  -~
and
Gy (Wi)  F  Fx (Wi) for  some  Wi
where:  Gy =  cumulative density for Y
Fx =  cumulative density for X
Wi  - wealth in state i.
Equation  (1) says  that, in order  for  instrument X  to  be preferable  to
instrument  Y,  the  accumulated  area  under  the  cumulative  probability
distribution of Y must be greater than the accumulated area for X, below
any given level of wealth  (wi).  In other words, instrument X has a lower
variability than instrument Y if the cumulative difference between Gy and
Fx is non-negative for any level of wealth wi.3 1
48.  The importance of second order stochastic dominance is that all
risk-averse  investors32 would  consistently  prefer  one  distribution  of
outcomes over another if the criteria in equation (1) are satisfied.  It
should be noted that this criterion is not an efficiency rule but a ranking
rule for alternative distributions of uncertain outcomes.  It is not the
purpose of this paper to explore optimality issues at this stage.  Rather,
the intention is to illustrate that governments (and firms) must evaluate
the entire distribution of outcomes and not simply the  mean.
49.  Methodology:  Even  though  rankings  have  been  determined
analytically  in  the  literature in an  expected utility or mean  variance
31/ See  Copeland  and  Weston  (1980)  for  a  non-technical  introduction  of this  concept.
32/ Investors  with  concave  utility  functions  in  wealth.- 28 -
framework  as noted  earlier,  they  have been unable  to provide  policymakers
with the practical tools needed to form tax policy.  When models are too
complex to give analytic solutions, simulation provides a practical
alternative. 33 By describing  individual  events  in the system  rather  than
its  overall  behavior,  the  simulation  model  shows  how  risks  are  shared  under
alternative  contract  terms. The cash  flow  model  used  can include  standard
investment items such as exploration  and development  costs as well as
quancities  extracted,  price  and  operating  costs. Changes  in the  time  path
of real  prices  as  well  as in inflation  should  be incorporated  as  parameters
that can be changed  at the user's  discretion.  To simplify  the initial
analysis,  it is assumed  that  the  geological  composition  of the  deposit  and
investment  costs  are  known  with certainty, 34 that  real  relative  prices  are
constant, 35 that  price  and cost  uncertainty  do not increase  with time,  and
that there  is no inflation. For  purposes  of clarity,  the instruments  are
analyzed  one at a time to avoid  any interaction  between  instruments  that
can complicate  the analysis.  In the reported  simulations,  an instrument
that is preferred by one of the parties for a given set of project
33/  Deacon  (1990)  uses  a  simulation  model  to  examine  the  welfare  loss  of  different  taxes  in
the  petroleum  industry  in  the  U.S.
34/  Allowing for uncertainty  in development  costs flattens  the distribution  of returns
(NPV).
35/  When the price follows  a  Brownian  motion (increasing  uncertainty  over time),  the
variability  of returns (NPV) to both parties increases,  but the rankings remain
unchanged. It is important  to differentiate  between  the time  path  of nominal  and real
cost. It is assumed  in  many  projects  that  real  relative  prices  have  no time  trend  (for
example,  the  real  price  of  copper  over  the  past  120  years  [Gordon  et al.  1987])  and  thus
only  nominal  adjustments  are  made. This  assumption  is  neither  general  nor satisfactory
for  many  inputs  and  outputs,  labor  in particular.  A constant  real  wage  is  tantamount  to
assuming that real GDP increases  only at the rate of population  growth.  While a
convenient  assumption  for  eteady  state  theoretical  analysis,  a constant  real  wage  is  not
consistent  with  the  historical  development  of  most  economies.- 29 -
assumptions  is also  preferred  under  alternative  project  assumptions. This
is  not  a general  result,  but  may  nevertheless  seem  somewhat  surprising.  It
is partly  explained  by the fact that the parties  are assumed  to prefer
lower  variance  in expected  net  present  value  rather  than  lower  variance  in
the  profile  of a  project's  cash  flow  over  the  years. 36
50.  As  noted  earlier,  the  extraction  profile  is  determined
exogenoLasly. The reason for this is that, in order to analyze risk
sharing,  it is necessary  to hold constant  the total  risk to be shared.
This in turn requires  total  extraction  to be held constant  as changes  in
the total  volume  of output  can change  both the  marginal  and total  risk of
the  project. 37
51.  A stylized  mining  project cash flow is generated  by the model.
Large  capital  costs  are  assumed  to have  been  incurred  and  known  at the  time
of analysis.  Operating costs, however, are uncertain.  Probability
distributions  are, therefore,  specified  for both prices  and costs.  For
purposes of the current illustration,  a joint normal distribution is
selected  with  no autocorrelation  through  time  but  with positive  covariance. 38
The latter  assumption  is consistent  with basic  microeconomic  theory (an
36/ It is with respect  to  variance  of cash flow  for  a given  project  that  the instruments
differ  most  in  terms  of risk  sharing  capability.  In  a  model  where  the  variance  of cash
flow  appears,  it  is  more  likely  that  a  chFnge  in  raking  between  instruments  would  occur
when  project  assumptions  change. This  obviously  warrants  some theoretical  clarification
between  further  simulations  are  performed.
37/  It  is  easy  to  demonstrate  that  the  total  variance  of  a  project  increases  with  total
extraction  if  production  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to  scale.
38/ In  the  general  model,  autocorrelation  (in  real  terms)  and  covariance  (either  positive  or
negative)  can  be  introduced.- 30 -
increase  in the price of oil will generally  be expected  to lead to an
increase  in  the  price  of oil  drilling  equipmein  j. 39
52.  The  total  cash  flow  is  then  divided  between  the  two  parties  to  the
contract  using a risk simulator.  In this study,  it is assumed  that the
government  seeks  to obtain  40  percent  of the  expected  net  present  value  of
the  project. This  value  may be interpreted  as the  amount  in present  value
terms that a risk neutral resource owner might be paid today for the
mineral  rights. Thus,  40 percent  of the present  value  is essentially  the
minimum  opportunity  cost  of a risk  neutral  resource  owner.
53.  The  rate of each instrument is then calibrated so that the
government  receives  the  specified  share  of the  expected  value. The  royalty
rate is determined  by dividing  the  present  value  of the  government's  share
by the expected  present  value of total  receipts.  The rates for the RRT
must be determined  iteratively  in the context  of the simulations. These
contract  terms create  autocorrelation  in the distribution  of cash flows
that  arises  from  the  provisions  that  losses  can  be carried  forward  and  that
no payments  are made in situations  where the  present  value is zero.  For
these  reasons,  it is necessary  to  make an initial  estimate  of the  rate  and
to  revise  the  rate  through  iterations  until  the  contracting  parties  receive
their  respective  shares. 40
C.  Results
54.  Two  simulations  are  presented  to  provide  a  preliminary
illustration  of the methodology  and ranking  system.  The only difference
39/  The  covariance  is  assumed  to  be contemporaneous  for  present  purposes  even  though  it  may
occur  with  a  lag  in  actual  situations.  When  zero  covariance  is assumed,  the total
variability  to  the  project  decreases,  but in this  case  the relative  rankings  between
agents  remains  the  same.
40/  A  brief  description  of  the  model  and  simulation  procedure  is  contained  in  Appendices  2
and  3.- 31 -
between the simulations is the probability of negative present values.  The
probability of a negative net present value is 26 percent for Case #1 and
42 percent for Case #2 (see Figure 1).41  The contract rates are reported
in Table 1 for each case, along  with summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3.
55.  The use  of a  constant mean  provides a convenient and practical
benchmark for determining rates for the different instruments in light of
their respective risk sharing features.  That is, given the parameters of
the model, if the government wants 40 percent of a project's expected NPV,
then it must set the royalty rate at three percent or the RRT rate at 32
percent when there is a 26 percent chance that the project will fail, and
at one percent or 13 percent respectively if the probability of  failure
increases to 42 percent.  The higher the probability of failure (negative
NPVs),  the  lower will  be  the mean  NPV  and the  lower will  be  the rate
required to capture 40 percent of it.  The rate changes are non-linear  with
respect to the probability of failure.
56.  It is interesting to note the relatively low rates necessary for
the government to accrue 40 percent of the net present value for all three
contract terms.  The  royalty consistently has the lowest rate as  it is
computed from the largest base (sales).  The free equity type of income tax
rate is also low (nine  percent in Case #1) relative to expectations.  There
are a number of reasons  why such a low rate can generate sufficient revenue
to accrue 40 percent of the net present  value.  First, revenues accrue only
when the base is greater than zero.  The government has no losses of its
own to recoup and so this lowers the rate. Second, the opportunity cost of
41/ In the simulations  reported,  the higher  probability  of failure  arises  from higher
initial  costs.  It  is possible  with the  model,  however,  to  have  the  higher  probability
of failure  arise  from  other  causes,  such  as greater  uncertainty  over  time  with  respect
to  prices  and  operating  costs,  for  example.- 32  -
Figure  1: Expected  Value  of Project  Returns  (NPV)  Given  Different Probabilities  of Failure
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Table  1:  Comparison  of  Rates  When Government  Receives
402  of Proiect  Cash  Flow
Case 1  Case  2
Project  NPV  $400  $100
Prob.  NPV  <  0  262  422
Output  Royalty  32  12
Income  Tax  92  21
Resource  321  131
Rent  Tax- 34 -
Table  2:  Summary  Table
Case I
Expected  NPV  Prob.  NPV  s  0
Mining  Project  $400  26Z
Share  of  NPV  received  by:
Royalty  Government  $160  0%
Firm  $240  33%
Income  Tax  Government  $160  0%
Firm  $240  33%
Resource  Government  $160  26%
Rent  Tax  Firm  $240  26%
Notes:
-exclusive  use  of one  tax/payment  instrument.
-the  government  and  firm  share  the  NPV  of the  project  40/60.- 35 -
Table  3: Summary  Table
Case  2
(higher  exploration  costs)
Expected  NPV  Prob.  NPV  s  0
Mining  Project  $100  42S
Share  of NPV  received  by:
Royalty  Government  $40  0%
Firm  $60  44%
Income  Tax  Government  $40  0t
Firm  $60  44%
Resource  Government  $40  42%
Rent  Tax  Firm  $60  42%
Notes:
-exclusive  use  of one  tax/payment  instrument.
-the  government  and  firm  share  the  NPV  of the  project  40/60.- 36 -
capital is not incorporated.  This  further increases the effective base.
The  RRT  has  the  highest  rate  of  the  three  instruments  but  it  is
significantly lower than the 40 percent NPV share (32 percent in Case #1).
Unlike  the  income  tax  base,  the  base  for  the  RRT  incorporates  the
opportunity cost of capital,  which defers the accrual of positive cash flow
for  the government.  However,  like the income tax, the  government only
receives positive cash flow if the base is greater than zero.  This will
reduce the rate below  40 percent  as the rate is based only on expected
positive outcomes.
57.  In Case  12,  the initial costs are higher.  Thus, there is a shift
in  the  expected  value  of  the  overall distribution of outcomes with  no
change in the overall variability of project revenue.  The royalty rate is
lower in Case  #2 as would  be expected given that a lower present value
needs  to be collected.  Both  the income tax and the RRT  rates decrease
dramatically.  Higher  investment  costs  imply  higher  loss offsets  that
increase the period of zero government revenues.  However, the effective
base  falls  by  less  than  the  present  value  of  expected  revenue  for
government.  This decreases the rate.
58.  The  time profiles of  revenue to the  government under the three
instruments are dramatically different though their mean NPV is identical.
Positive cash flow accrues to the government under both the royalty and the
income tax in every state of the world simulated (see Figures 2b and 2c).
A royalty is paid on extraction regardless of  whether the net present value
is positive or not.  Thus, this result is to be expected.  It is also to be
expected that there will be a positive cash flow to the government under
the income  tax  in  all  cases.  Book  accounting  and  the  non-incorporation  of
the  opportunity  cost  of capital  combine  to increase  the  base  of the  charge.- 37  -
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The  effective  base  of the  income  tax  is cash  flow  adjusted  for
depreciation.  The summation  of cash flow can be positive  even when the
present  value of the  project  is negative. This benefit  to the government
accrues  at a cost  to  the  firm  as it  increases  the  probability  that  the  firm
will  have  negative  present  values. For  instance,  in  Case #1 (Table  2),  the
probability  of a negative present value for the firm increases  to 33
percent  under  the  royalty  and  the  income  tax,  compared  to 26 percent  under
the  RRT.  Under  the  RRT, the  government  and  firm  each  have  the  same  risk  as
the overall  project.  Unlike the royalty  and income  tax, which have no
downside  risk for the  government,  under  the  RRT  the government  collects  no
cash 26 percent  of the time in Case  #1 and 42 percent  of the time in Case
#2 (Table 3).  In other words, the downside risks to the government
increase  dramatically  under  the  RRT relative  to the other  two instruments
(solid  line  with zero  revenue  in Figure  2d),  whereas  the  risks  to the  firm
do not increase  as dramatically  under  the  royalty  and income  tax compared
to the  RRT.
59.  An examination  of the distribution  of outcomes  under each scheme
reveals  that the income  tax of the free equity  type and the royalty  are
remarkably similar (see Figure 3).  Two factors  combine to yield this
similarity.  First,  the  covariance  between  revenues  and  the  present  value  is
high.  Second,  the positive  covariance  between  prices  and costs  increases
the pos..tiva  relationship between revenues and present values.  The
covariance  effect  can  be illustrated  by the  simple  case  of one  period  where
costs are a  linear function  of prices  with no supply  shocks.  If the
probability  of negative  present  values is zero,  then the distribution  of
the income  tax and the royalty  will be identical. This is true because
profit  is  merely  a linear  function  of  price  shocks,  which  implies  that  forFigure  3: Variations  in the Returns  to Government  and Firm with the
Same  Expected  Value  Across  Instruments
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the  same revenue the  income tax and the royalty would be perfectly
correlated  yielding  identical  distributions.
60.  Figure  3c illustrates  more clearly  that under the RRT, downside
risks to the government  are much higher relative  to the other contract
terms  as the  probability  of a zero  NPV is  much higher.  By contrast,  for
the firm, the RRT has both lower downside and lower upside potential
compared to the other instruments,  which implies  that the mass of the
frequency  distribution  is  more  concentrated.
61.  Since  distributions  for  the various  instruments  are very
dissimilar,  it is necessary  to compute  the differences  in the cumulative
distributions  both for the government  and the firm to determine  if one
instrument  can consistently  be prefe-red  over another.  The results  are
depicted  graphically  in Figures  4a through  5b.  The graphs  show that the
government  will rank the royalty  higher  than either  the income  tax  or the
RRT, and rank the income  tax higher than the RRT.  However,  the exact
opposite  ranking  is found  for the firm. 42 That is,  the firm  would  prefer
the  RRT  to the  income  tax  and  the income  tax to the  royalty. Furthermore,
these rankings  are the same across  cases.  These results  are consistent
with theory 43 and  with logic. Given  a specific  total  risk  to  be shared,  an
instrument  that creates  lower  variability  for  one Rarty  will of necessity
shift more variability  onto the other Rarty.  Thus there is a natural
conflict of interest  between  the parties  with respect  to risk, holding
their  respective  mear  constant.
42/  Recall  the  definition  of  second  order  dominance  found  in  equation  #1  as  a  measure  of  the
cumulative  differences.  The  graphs  should  be  read  with  this  in  mind and  with  respect  to
the  legends  presented  on  the  graphs.
43/  See  Conrad  (1988)  and  the  references  therein.- 41  -
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62.  This implies  that ranking  revenue  instruments  according  to risk
sharing  features  will vary between  parties  with different  risk  preferences
and wealth.  That is, it  will be necessary.  in general.  for contracting
Rarties  to trade  mean exRected  values  for  risk  in reaching  mutual  agreement
regarding  contract  terms. Thus  there  is  no reason  to  expect  that  in actual
situations  one  instrument  (or one  set of contract terms) will  be
consistently  preferred  to another  by  both  parties.
D.  Summary
63.  The illustrative  results are presented  with two objectives  in
mind--first,  to illustrate  how  alternative  rankings  might  be developed,  and
second, to illustrate the practical potential of relatively simple
techniquea.
64.  Applying  these  techniques  to the  stylized  cash flow  model  enables
one to demonstrate  numerically  a familiar result from the literature;
namely,  if  both  parties  are  risk  averse.  they  will  not  necessarily  have the
same ranking  of schemes.  holding  the  mean  returns  constant. Therefore,  in
general,  gains  are to be had if the contracting  parties  are prepared  to
trade  mean expected  value  for  risk. This implies  that  no single  instrument
(or set of contract terms) can be a priori advocated  as suRerior  for
mineral dependent developing countries.  Each country has different
endowments  (portfolio  of initial  assets)  and  faces  different  risks. These
factors must  be  taken  into account when  selecting instruments and
determining  rates.  In some cases,  where assets  are not and cannot  be
diversified,  royalties  may be justified  and shonld  not be sys'ematically
de-emphasized  as they are now.  In other cases,  where the asset  base is
diversified,  RRTs may we more appropriate.  However, governments  that
employ  the  RRT  should  be aware  that  there  is a significant  probability  that- 46 -
their mineral endowments  will be extracted and that their economies  will be
forced to adjust to the changes in comparative advantage brought about by
mineral extraction without them ever receiving a positive payment.  It is
common  to  report  mean  values when  evaluating  the net  present value  of
mineral  projects.  However,  all  parties  should  be  aware  that  the
probability is zero that the mean value will occur.  Recognition of risk is
important and should be incorporated into the analysis.
65.  The last stateme.it  highlights the second contribution of this work
which is to demonstrate that it is now possible for governments to engage
in this type of risk analysis at little cost.  The decrease in the relative
cost  of  computer power  and programs makes  it  economically possible  for
governments  (and donors)  to perform  detailed and precise  risk  analysis
using microcomputers and spreadsheet  programs.  Government policymakers can
run  the  types  of  simulations  discussed  in  this  paper  for  the  unique
circumstances of their country and measure the alternative distributions of
outcomes.  This should give them a better understanding of the nature of
revenue variability under different contract regimes.
66.  The  results  reported  in  this  paper  are  illustrative  and
preliminary, but they point to areas in which more work will be necessary.
First, the module should be tested in a specific case or two.  This will
orovide  an  opportunity  to  refine extraction profiles  to  reflect actual
situations more  accurately, to estimate empirically variations in prices
and  costs  that  are  to  be  incorporated  and  to  rank  other  instruments.
Second,  there  is  a  need  to  develop simulation methods  for  arriving at
specific contract terms  (by trading means  or pricing risk).  Third, the
variance in the cash flow over time should  be considered in addition to the
variance  in NPV to reflect the concerns of  the parties more  accurately.- 47 -
Fourth,  there  may be a need to determine  and incorporate  the  way in  which
alternative  mineral  payment/tax  policies  affect  the  overall  variability  in
the economy,  both in terms  of total  government  revenue  and intersectoral
effects. 44 Incorporating  empirical  and  institutional  effects  such  as these
should  make it possible  to  demonstrate  the  power  of these  simple  methods  in
applied  situations.
44/  For  example,  as  noted  earlier,  it  has been  observed  that  the discovery  of significant
mineral  endowments  increased  the  real  exchange  rate  in  developing  economies.  This
increase  tends  to  depress  the  profitability  of  traditional  exports.  However,  this
change  will  work  in  reverse  as  the  reserves  are  depleted  (or  as  mineral  prices  fall).- 48 -
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Descrigtion  of Princilal  Mineral  Tax/Payment  Arrangements
Bonus  Bid
This type of arrangement  is equivalent  to the outright  sale of the
mineral  reserves  (or  a  mining  tract). The  resource  owner  bears  no risk  in  this
case.  In a private  ownership  economy,  such  arrangements  can  be enforced  via
contracts  because  the sale  of the  private  ownership  rights  legally  transfers
title  of the  land  and  reserves  to the  producer. The seller  has  no claim  after
the  sale. A national  government  that  holds  the  mineral  rights  is in  a somewhat
different  situation  as the  bonus  bid  arrangement  is  equivalent  to selling  part
of  the  country  to  a  third  party. Sovereign  risk  is  another  problem. Firms  know
that  the  government  can  observe  the  outcome  of  exploration  and  production.  The
government  may  be  inclined  to  nationalize  or  impose  other  charges  if  exploration
is successful. For these  reasons,  bonus  bids are  seldom  used  except  to lease
public  tracts  to  private  firms  for  exploration  purposes. The  value  of the  bid
can  be  determined  by an  auction  if  there  is  sufficient  competition  among  bidders
or  by the  determination  of a reservation  price  by the  owner  of the  tract.
Fixed  Fees
The  opposite  case  in  terms  of  risk  sharing  is  the  fixed  payment  to the
contractor,  or a service  fee arrangement  where the contractor's  return is
independent  of the  profitability  of the  enterprise.
Cost  Plus
A special  case  of  fixed  fees  is  a  cost  plus  arrangement  that  places  100
percant  of  the  risk  of the  project  onto  the  government  while  the  firm  is  simply
p2
hired  to  explore  for  and  extract  the  mineral. This  scheme  is  particularly  prone
to  incentive  problems,  since  the  government  pays  the  firm  for  expenses,  but  finds
that  it  is  extremely  costly  to  monitor  the  efficiency  with  which  the  firm  carries
out exploration,  development  and resource  extraction.  This can result  in
inefficient  extraction  decisions  as there  are no incentives  to reduce  costs.
To partially  mitigate  this problem,  a regressive  cost  sha':ing  arrangement  can
be introduced  in  which the  government  reimburses  a  smaller  amount  of the  costs
as the  costs  increase.
Royalty
A royalty  can  be levied  either  on output  or  on extraction.  Royalties
(or  severance  taxes)  on output  are one of the  most popular  forms  of payment
schemes  due  mainly  to their  administrative  simplicity.  A royalty  on  output  can
be  levied  on an "ad  valorem"  basis (a  percentage  of price)  or on a "specific
basis"  (per  unit  of output). Royalties  on output  can  induce  high  grading  and
change  the  intertemporal  extraction  profile  of the  firm,  often  resulting  in  the
premature  closure  of a mine.  For  this reason,  they can  be distortionary  and
undesirable.  The  advantage  is  that  they  generate  revenue  for  the  government  as
soon  as  production  starts.
A royalty  on extraction  is a charge  on the  mineral  as an input  into
production.  If  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  inputs  is  zero,  there  will
be no substitution  in the  use of inputs  and  the  charge  can  be approximated  by
a  charge  on  output  at  a  lower  rate  (proportional  to  the  input  share  in  the  value
of outputs).  If input substitution  is possible,  the charge  can result in
efficient  use of the  resource. Administratively,  a royalty  on extraction  can
be difficult  because  of  valuation  problems,  given  that  there  is  often  no  market3
price  for  these  inputs. Procedures  such  as  net-back  pricing  or  reference  prices
can  sometimes  be  used to approximate  the  value  of the  mineral.
Production  Sharin2
Under  production  sharing  arrangements,  the  government  and firm  share
in the  value  or the  quantity  of resource  produced. In this  case,  the  firm  may
provide financial,  technical and managerial know-how to establish  mining
operations  in  exchange  for  a certain  portion  of the  production  to  cover  costs,
while  buying  the  remainder  of  the  product  on  a  prearranged  basis. The  contractor
bears  all  of the  risk  during  the  exploration  and  development  phases  (although
the  government  has  an  interest  in  keeping  costs  low),  while  the  government  shares
in  the  risk  once  production  commences.
Profit  Sharing
Another  type  of sharing  arrangement  is  profit  sharing  (equity  sharing
or "participation").  This  arrangement  usually  provides  for  the  government  to
collect  its  revenues  in  the  form  of  dividends.  If the  government  purchases  its
shares,  it takes  risks  like any other  shareholder. Alternately,  the use of
"free"  equity,  in  lieu  of  purchased  equity,  can  be  justified  on  the  grounds  that
the  country  and  investor  bring  two  different  but  necessary  types  of  capital  into
the  operation--the  country  brings  the  resource  itself  and the  firm  brings  the
physical  capital and expertise.  However,  this analogy is limited.  The
nongovernmental  investor  sees  "free  equity"  as  a  reduction  of  his  return  on  the
physical  capital  over and  above  the  reductions  incurred  if  he is also subject
to income  and  output  payments. In effect,  free  equity  is  perceived  as a  means
of increasing  the  country's  returns  beyond  those  generated  through  other  fiscal4
instruments.  This  can  increase  incentives  to  employ  transfer  pricing  methods.
The  returns  from  equity  participation  for  the  government  will  accrue,  if  at  all,
only  after  a considerable  period  of time.  This  occurs  because,  in general,  a
significant  portion  of the  physical  capital  must  be recovered  and debt  repaid
before  any  dividends  are  declared.
Cash  Flow  Tax
A cash  flow  tax ("Brown  Tax")  is  based  on the  difference  between  cash
receipts  and  allowable  expenses  within  a period. The  government  shares  in  the
risks  by subsidizing  losses  at the  same  rate  that  gains  are  taxed. Under  this
tax, all exploration,  development  and operating  costs  are fully  recoverable,
resulting  in  a zero  marginal  effective  tax  rate  on the  returns  to investment.
The cash flow tax introduces  no distortions  and is suitable  for collecting
economic  rent,  but  may not  be best  where  parties  are risk  averse. Because  of
the  requirement  that  governments  share  fully  in  the  up front  risks  of  a  project,
the  Brown  Tax  haa  not  been  used in  practice. A more practical  version  of the
cash  flow  type  taxes  is the  resource  rent  tax.
Resource  Rent  Tax
The resource  rent tax (RRT)  carries  losses  forward  at the rate of
interest  when the net assessable  receipts  are negative,  and it provides  the
resource  owner  with  positive  revenues  only  in  periods  when  the  accumulated  net
assessable receipts are positive.  The government does not collect any revenue
if  the  net  present  value  of  the  project  is  zero  or  negative. This  scheme  allows
a threshold  rate  of return  to  the  investor  on a  project  before  any  traditional
taxes  are  payable. As such,  it  is  conceptually  prior  to  any  regular  income  tax5
(and  a deductible  cost from  it).  Otherwise,  after  uncertainty  is eliminated,
firms  would  effectively  be guaranteed  a return  higher  than  the  opportunity  cost
of the capital  used (similar  to the problem  of overcapitalization  in public
utilities).  This  would  result  in  a  reduced  value  of  the  resource  and  a  transfer
of resource  rent  from  the  government  owner  to  the  firm.
Income Tax
Many developing  country  governments  rely heavily  on income  related
charges  in the  mineral  sector. The  regular  income  tax  is often  superseded  by
an  income  tax  with  special  features  to  address  the  particular  problems  in  mining.
Two relatively  common  adjustments  to income  taxation  are provisions  of: (i)
immediate  expensing  of exploration  and  development  costs;  and (ii)  a  depletion
allowance. The rapid  writeoffs  are intended  to encourage  exploration  and to
compensate  for  risks  and  wasted  costs  associated  with  necessary  but  unsuccessful
ventures.
The  provision  for  immediate  expensing,  interest  deductions  and  special
allowances  can  result  in such  low  marginal  effective  tax  rates  that  the  sector
is de facto  subsidized  relative  to other  sectors  after  correcting  for  risk.6
Appendix  2
Mineral  Proiect  Cash  Flow  Model
The stylized  mineral  project  model  consists  of an investment  with a
known fixed outlay (exploration  and development  costs aree certain)  and an
unknown  net present  value (operating  costs  and gross revenues  are uncertain
through  the  lifetime  of the  project).  Using  standard  probability  distributions
for  output  prices  and  operating  costs,  a  series  of simulations  are  performed  to
generate  the  project's  cash  flow. For  each  scenario,  the  net  present  value  (NPV)
of  three  sets  of  returns  are  calculated:  (1)  total  project  returns;  (2)  the  share
accruing  to  the  government;  and  (3) the  share  accruing  to  the  firm. The  latter
two  vary  by instrument  whereas  the  first  return  is  a function  of the  project's
probability  of failure (NPV  <  0).  Expected  NPV refers to the mear value
resulting  from  repeated  simulations.
Assumptions
- There  is a single  project  with a finite  life.
- The geological  size and composition  of the deposit is known with
certainty.
- The extraction  profile  is determined  exogenously.
- Exploration  and  investment  costs  are  known  and  fixed.'/
- The price of the output is uncertain  and determined  on the world
market  .11
This  is  equivalent  to  evaluating  the  effect  of different  instruments  on  a  project's  cash  flow
after  exploration  and  investment  costs  have  been  incurred.
2/  The  project  output  is  assumed  to  be  small  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  Therefore,
changes  in  production  have  no  effect  on  international  prices  of  the  commodity.7
- Operating  costs  are  uncertain  and positively  correlated  with output
price.
- All  instruments  generate  the  same  fixed  proportion  of  the  expected  net
present  value  of the  project's  cash  flow  for  the  government.
- Losses  cannot  be used  to offset  income  from  other  sources.
- There is no inflation.
Model  Structure
Observed  project  revenue  in  year  t, R,,  is  determined  by  multiplying  the
stochastically  generated  price  by  the  quantity  produced  in  year  t. The  quantity
produced  in year t is determined  by the  exogenously  given  extraction  profile.
Variability in  the value  of  the  output (gross revenue) is,  therefore,
attributable  solely  to the  variability  in  price.
The  observed  price  in a given  year,  P',  is:
(1)  Pt  - E(Pt)  +  a,
where  E(P,)  is the  expected  price  and  at  is  the  price  shock.
Operating  costs,  Ct,  are  assumed  to  be positively  correlated  with output
price."'  Operating  costs  in  year  t  have  the  following  structure:
(2)  Ct  - {l  + P[Pt/E(Pt)-1J}  EE(Ct)  + vJ]
where E(C,)  is the expected  operating  cost per barrel,  and v, is the
direct, randomly  generated  shock,  normally  distributed  (O,aO2). p  is the
parameter  (which  could  be  based  on  an  estimated  regression  coefficient)  relating
price  to cost.
Capital  costs  in  a given  year,  Kt,  are  knownt
3/  For  example,  in  most  realistic  cases  when  the  price  of  oil  increases,  so  does  the  price  of
drilling  equipment.  This  is  equivalent  to  assuming  the  latter  is  not  perfectly  price
elastic.8
(3)  KR  - RK'  + 4,
where K, are costs incurred  in year t for exploration  and development
which  are  written  off  immediately  ("expensed"),  and  Kdt  are  depreciable  capital
costs  incurred  in  year  t.
The  project  cash  flow,  CF,,  is  derived  by  subtracting  operating  and  capital
costs  from  the  total  revenue  generated  by the  project:
(4)  CF,  - R,  C,  - R,
The  interest  rate,  i,  is  used  to  discount  project  costs  and  benefits. The
observed  net present  value of the  project  cash flow,  NPVCF,  is calculated  by
summing  the  discounted  cash  flows  in  each  year:
T
(5)  NPVCF  - CF
"'  'l+i)'
The  expected  NPVCF,  ENPVCF,  is the  mean of the  observed  NPVCF  generated
by the  series  of simulations.  The  government  receives  a constant  share  of the
ENPVCF:
(6)  G - 6(ENPVCF)
where 6  is the share  the government  receives  and  G is the  government's
expected  share  of the  project.
Bases  and  Rates  of  Tax/Payment  Instruments
i.  Royalty  in the  Form  of an  Ad Valorem  Tax  on OutRut
The  base  for  the  ad  valorem  royalty  tax  is  the  project's  gross  revenue  in
a given  year,  Rt.  The rate  of the royalty,  e,  is determined  by dividing  the
government's  expected  share  of the  project  G by the expected  NPV of project
revenue,  ENPV(R,):
(7)  Royalty  rate  - 0  - G
ENPV(Rt)9
The  observed  goverment  NPV and  firm  NPV under  the  royalty  are  the
following:
(8)  Observed  Govirnment  NPV  - O(NPV(R,))
(9) Observed  Firm  NPV  - NPVCF  - O(NPV(R,))
ii.  Income  Tax of the  "Free  Equitv"  Tvpe
The  base  for  this  type  of income  tax  ist
(10)  RL - Ct  - Kt  - Dt  +  Lt,
where  R,  - project  revenue  in  year t
Ct  operating  costs  in  year  t
K*-  capital  costs  in  year t  whi-  are  fully  expensed
t-  depreciation  written  off  i  year  t,  according  to  a selected
method  of depreciationsl
Lt,,  loss  carry  forward,  according  to the  followinq  rule:
Loss  Carry  Forward  Rules
(11) For  all  NCFt  - L,  t  0  :  No loss  carry  forward
(IIa)  For  all  NCFt  - Lt  c  0 t  Carry  forward  Lt.,  into  next  period,
whereL,.,  N  IICF, -Ltj
NCFt  - cash  flow  net of  depreciation
The  rate,  r,  for  the  Income  tax  is  calculated  by  dividing  the  government's
revenue  share  by the taxable  base,  that is, cash flow minus losses  carried
forward.
(12)Income  Tax  rate  - r - 6(NPVCP
NPV(NCF-L,)
61  Straight  lim  mtbod,  double  declining  balance  or  m-of-yer.'  disits,  for  aimple.10
r is applied  in each  period  that  NCF,  - L,  >  0.  The  gross  cash  flow  minus  the
payments  to  the  government  in  each  period  yield  the  after  tax  flows  to  the  firm.
(13)  Observed Government revenue in  period t - r  (NCFt  - Lt)  when (NCF,  - Lt)>O,
G  0  when (NCFt  - Lt)-O
(14)  Observed  Firm  cash  flow  in  period  t  - CFt  - Government  share  in  period  t
iii. Resource  Rent  Tax (RRT)
The  base  for  the  resource  rent  tax  is  cash  flow  (equation  (4))  with  a  loss
carry  forward  provision. All capital  costs (such  as exploration  investment)
are  expensed,  and losses  are  carried  forward  at the  rate  of interest. Hence,
the  taxable  base  is determined  according  to the  following  rule:
Lost  crry  Forward  Rule:
(15)  For  all  CFt  - L,  L  0 :  No loss  carry  forward
(15a)For  all  CFt  Lt  <  0 :  Carry  forward  Lt.,  into  next  period,
whereLt+ 1-ICFt  - L,1(1+i)
CFt-gross  cash  flow  in  period  t
Lt- stock  of loss  carry  forward  in  period  t
i - Interest  rate
The  resource  rent  tax  rate,  X, is applied  in each  period  that  CFt  - Lt  >
0.  The  after  tax  flows  to the  firm  in  each  period  are  equal  to  the  total  cash
flow  minus  the  payments  to the  government  in  that  period.
(16)  Observed  Government  revenue  in  period  t  - +(CF,  - Lt)  when (CF,  - Lt)>O-
- 0  when (CFt  - Lt)SO
(17)  Observed  Firm  * >  i  flow  in  period  t  - CF,  - Government  revenue  in  period  t11
The  rate  for  the  RRT  must  be determined  iteratively  in  the  context  of the
simulation,  due to the  combined  effect  of the  loss  carry  forward  property  and
the  fact  that  the  government  receives  no  revenue  when  the  base  is  zero  (this  can
be a  significant  time  period  when  losses  are  large  in  the  initial  stages  of the
project). The  RRT  rate  is  determined  by the  following:
(18)X  - G
NPVCF'
where NPVCF'  - NPV of years when CFt  - L,  > 0
As the  probability  of negative  project  NPV  increases,  the  RRT rate  will
decrease. At first  glance  this  may seem  counterintuitive,  but it  makes  sense
as losses reduce the expected  NPV of project cash flow.  The lower the
probability  of failure,  the  higher  will  be  the  expected  NPV  of  project  cash  flow
and  the  higher  will  be the  rate  required  to capture  G.12
Appendix  3
Model  Parameter  Values
Parameters  for  Case 1  V:s
Project life  - 25 years
Interest  rate  - '  6  percent
Total  Production  - 700  barrels
Expected  Oil  Price  - $16.50/barrel
Operating  Costs  - $1.50/barrel
Exploration  Costs  - $3.50/barrel
Development  Costs  - $4.00/barrel
Depreciable  Capital  - $0.50/barrel
Costs
Government  share  of  NPVCF  - 40  percent
Time  Profiles:
Tear.  1-3: Exploration  costs  are  incurred.
Years  4-6t Development  and  depreciable  capital  costs  are  incurred.
Year  6:  Extraction  begins  and is spread  over  a  15  year period  (with
production  at its  maximum  rate during  the second  and third
years  (8.79  percent)  and  deeliinig  for  each  successive  year).
Simulation  Procedure
A Lotus  1-2-3  add-in  program  called  "BRISK"  is used.  Using  @RISK,  the
price  and  operating  cost  parameters  are  represented  by  probability  distributions
which  are  used  during  the  simulation.'V
The  expected  price  of  oil,  E(P,)  is $16.50  per  barrel  and  is  constant  for
It  In  case  2,  exploration  costs  are  increased  to  $4.00/barrel.
it  The nominal  and real  interest  rates  are  equivalent  since  there  is  no lnflation  In  the  model.
7/  The Latin  Hypercube method of  sampling vas  used,  bowever,  the  Monte Carlo  method can  also
be  used.13
the  life  of  the  project.  The  simulated  price  in  year  t follows  equation  (1)  in
Appendix  2.1'  The  price  shock,  a,,  is  normally  distributed  (0,  6.8)!1,  consistent
with the  historical  oil  price  trend. P,  is  multiplied  by  the  quantity  extracted
in  each  year  to get  project  revenue,  R,.
Expected  operating  costs,  E(C,),  are  $1.50  per  barrel  for  the  life  of the
project. Actual  operating  costs  are  calculated  according  to equation  (2)  in
Appendix  2.  The  regression  coefficient,  0,  is set  to 0.5.  This is  motivated
by the  assumption  that  operating  costs,  as  woll as the  other  variables  in the
model,  are  damand  determined.  The  independent  shock,  v,,  is  normally  distributed
(0,  0.5).  After  being subjected  to the independent  shock,  the cost is then
multiplied  by the  covariance  effect  as shown  in equation  (2).
Once  NPVCF  has  been  determined  according  to  equations  (4)  and (5),  it is
multiplied  by 6, the fixed  percentage  of the expected  NPVCF the government
receives. The  tax  rates  are  calculated  and  applied  to  each  base  as  shown  below.
In  an alternative  scenario,  price  follovw  a  uniform  distribution.  This  year's  price  falls
vithin  a  range  of  x  percent  higher  or  lower  than  last  year's  price.
9/  The second  number  in  the  parentheses  refers  to  the  standard  deviation.14
Base  Loss  Carry  Forward  Provision
Instruments
Royalty  R.  None
Income  Tax  R,  -C  - V,  - D,  +  L.+1 Without  interest
Resource
Rent  Tax  CF,  + L,.,  With interest
P  - project  revenue  in  year  t
CFt  - cash  flow  in  year  t
C5  - operating  costs  in  year  t
Kt-  capital  costs  in  year  t  that  are  fully  expensed
Dt-  total  depreciable  capital  written  off  in  year t,
according  to depreciation  method. For  straight  line
depreciation:
Dt  - EZ  ddtj
s-0
where  ddtJ  - Vt/n  if  t  S  J+n
or  - 0  if  t  >  j+n
j  - year  in  which  asset  K"t  is  written  off
-,  depreciable  capital  incurred  in  year  t
n  - tax life of the asset
L,.u-  loss  carry  forward,  when applicable15
Tex/Pameut  Rates  for  Case  1  and  Case  2
Case  1  Case  2
Output  Royalty  32  1S
Income  Tax  91  21
Resource  321  131
Rent  Tax16
Apiendis  4
Glossary  of TermsW°
Cumuletive  Freauency  Distribution
A cumulation  of the frequency  (progressively  adding  bar  heights)  across
the range  of a frequency  distribution. A cumulative  distribution  can be an
"upwardly  sloping"  curve,  where  the  distribution  describes  the  probability  of
a  value  less  than  or  equal  to  any  variable  value. Alternatively,  the  cumulative
curve may  be  "downwardly  sloping",  where the distribution  describes the
probability  of a  value  greater  than  or equal  to any  variable  value.
Economic  Rent
The  return  to  a factor  over  and  above  that  needed  to induce  the  allocation
of the  factor  to  a  given  activity. Thus,  changes  in  economic  rent (for  example
through  taxation)  will not  affect  the  allocation  of resources  at the  margin.
Expected  Value (Mean)
The  sum  of all  values  in the  set,  divided  by the  total  number  of  values
in  the  set.
Frequencv  Distribution
Constructed  from  data  by arranging  values  into  classes  and representing
the frequency  of occurrence  in any class by the height  of the bar.  The
frequency  of  occurrence  of  a class  relative  to total  occuarrences  represents  the
probability  of occurrence  (hence  it is  also  called  probability  distribution).
Iteration
A recalculation  of the  model  during  a  simulation.  During  each  iteration,
all uncertain variables are sampled once according to their probability
distributions,  and  the  model is recalculated  using  these  sampled  values.  The
number  of iterations  desired  is  specified  when  using  the  @RISK  program.
Latin  Hvpercube  Sampling  Technicue
A  relatively  new  stratified  sampling  technique  used  in  simulation  modeling.
Stratified sampling techniques tend  to  force convergence  of  a  sampled
distribution  in fewer samples than in a  Monte Carlo sampling  technique.
Stratification  divides the cumulative  curve into equal intervals on the
cumulative  probability  scale  (0  to  1).  A sample  is  then  randomly  selected  from
each  interval  of  the  input  distribution,  thus  recreating  the  input  distribution.
L°l  Some  definitions  taken  from  6RISK  User's  Guide  (1989).17
Mean  Variance  Analysis
Mean variance  analysis  has been extensively  employed  in risk analysis.
It  describes  attitudes  to  risk  in  terms  of  the  mean  and  variance  of  income. Its
use  is  appropriate  when  the  distribution  of  income  is  normal,  or  when  all  assets
together  have normally  distributed  returns.  This type of analysis  is not
appropriate  when  distributions  are  not  normal  or  when  the  actor's  choice  changes
the  form  of  the  distribution  of  returns  (trying  to  reduce  the  weight  in  the  tail
of the  distribution).
Monopolv  Rent
Monopoly  rent can arise  for any number  of reasons:  barriers  to entry,
technological  innovation,  etc.  For example,  the structure  of the  market  can
generate  monopoly  rents  in two  ways.  First,  the oligopolistic  nature  of the
intermediate  demanders  (the  multinationals--MNCs)  can  give  rise  to  the  existence
of  excess  profits  for  the  sole  (monopsonistic)  supplier.  Second,  it  is  possible,
as  OPEC  price  increases  have  demonstrated,  to  increase  monopoly  rents,  even  for
an oligopolistic  supply  structure,  by in effect "taxing'  competitive  final
demanders. The  extent  to  which  the  intermediate  demanders  (MNCs)  are  able to
shift  the  tax  onto  the  final  demanders  depends  on the  degree  of  competitiveness
of  the final demand market and on the existence of substitutes.  Where
substitutes  are  few  and  markets  at  the  final  demand  stage  are  competit 4ve, the
tax  will  be more  easily  shifted  to the  final  consumer. Thus,  the  two  kinds  of
monopoly  rent  differ  in  who  eventually  bears  the  burden  of the  tax.
Natural  Resource  Rent
Natural  Resource  Rent  arises  due to the  exhausLuble  nature  of m,nerals.
The  rent  increases  as  total  stocks  (reserves)  diminish.  This  type  of  rent  arises
even  when the  resource  is of uniform  aualitv  and distrioution. In audition,
changes  in the  size  of this  rent  affects  behavior  at the  margin. Thus,  it is
a  price  not  an economic  rent.
Opportunity  Cost
The amoant  of a good that  must  be given  up in  order  to produce  another
good,  or  the  value  of  the  next  boet  alternative.  Intertemporally  it  represents
the  value  of goods  today  (current)  in  terms  of  goods  foregone  tomorrow  (in  the
future).  Intersectorally  it  represents  the  value  of  goods  in  one  sector  in  terms
of goods  foregone  in other  sectors.
Probability  Distribution
A  probability  distribution  or  probability  density function is  the
statistical  term for a frequency  distribution  constructed  from  an infinitely
large  set  of  values  where  the  class  size  is  infinitesimally  small. See  frequency
distribution.
Quasi-Rent
Since  the  mining  industry  is  highly  capital-intensive  and  its  capital  is18
immobile  in the  short-run,  capital  in the  sector  enjoys  a sizeable  quasi-rent.
As a result,  in the  short  run,  taxation  of capital  is  not likely  to discourage
the  use of capital  as much  as taxing  labor  is likely  to discourage  the  use  of
labor  (which  is  often  more  mobile). However,  in  the  long  run  taxing  capital  can
discourage  investment.  In addition,  other  relatively  scarce  factors  in  mining
such  as  managerial  and  technical  know-how  also  enjoy  quasi-rents.
Ricardian  Rent
Ricardian  rent  arises  from  quality  differences.  It  is  normally  associated
in  agriculture  with differential  fertilities  or location  of land--the  marginal
land  generating  zero  rent  even  though  it has  a positive  price  associated  with
its scarcity  value.  In the mineral  sector  it arises  due to differences  in
quality  of ores,  pressure  of  oils  and  gases,  location,  or ease  of  mining.
Risk
Risk  measures  the  probability  and  severity  of loss.  The  notion  of risk
epresupposes  a lack of predictability,  but it acutally  arises  from a well
understood  probabilistic  process. For  example,  the  risk  associated  with a bet
on a fair coin toss is known  with certainty;  the risk has no uncertainty,
although  the  outcome  of the  toss  is  uncertain.
Shadow  Price
The  social  opportunity  cost  of  goods  and  services  estimated  for  the  economy
as a  whole.
Skewness
Skewness  is a measure  of the shape  of a distribution.  It indicates  the
degree  of asymmetry  in a distribution.  Skewed  distributions  have  more  values
to the  one  side  of the  most likely  value,  that  is,  one  tail  is longer  than  the
other. The  higher  the  skewness  value,  the  more  skewed  will  be the  distribution.
Standard  Deviation
Tne standar'  deviation  is the  square  root  of the  variance.
Stochastic
Stochastic  is a synonym  for  uncertain.
Stochastic  Dominance
First  Order  Stochastic  Dominance:  An asset  is said to  be stochastically
dominant  over  another  if  an individual  receives  greater  wealth  from  it  in  every
(ordered)  state  of nature. This is  known  as first  order  stochastic  dominance
and  applies  to all  increasing  utility  functions  including  linear  functions.
Second  Order  Stochastic  Dominance:  Second  order  stochastic  dominance  not
only  assumes  utility  functions  where  me.rginal  utility  of wealth  is positive,19
but also  that total  utility  must increase  at a decreasing  rate,  that is, the
utility  function  is concave. Hence,  under  second  order  stochastic  dominance,
individuals  are  assumed  to  be risk  averse.'
User  Cost
The  payment  which  is  collected  by the  owner  of an  endowment  based  on its
scarcity  value.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty  refers  to lack  of definite  knowledge  or a lack  of sureness.
Here,  the  lack  of  predictability  arises  from  insufficient  knowledge.
Variance
The  variance  measures  how  widely  dispersed  values  are  in a  distribution,
and is a measure  of risk  in symmetric  distributions.  It is calculated  as the
average  of the  squared  deviations  about  the  mean.  The  variance  is the  square
of the  standard  deviation.
Windfall  Rent
Windfall  rents  (gain)  are  largely  due  to  sudden  increases  in  demand  in  the
presence  of low  short-run  supply  elasticities.  Taxing  these  rents  is neutral
intertemporally  only  if  windfall  losses  are  subsidized.
l~  See  Copeland  and  Weston  (1980).PRE Working Paper Series
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